




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Lower Egyptian Gallery, University of Pennsylvania Museum (page 78)



Universities and the Intelligence Community

During the Association's Sixty-fourth Annual Meeting this past June, Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, was joined by Morton Halperin, Director of the Center for National Security Studies, and John William Ward, President of Amherst College, in a panel discussion on the relationship between the CIA and the academic community. The panel was moderated by Professor Henry Mason (Tulane University). During his remarks, Admiral Turner stated that the CIA presently recruits a small proportion of the some 120,000 foreign students attending American colleges and universities, and that "just like business or other government agencies" the CIA recruits openly on about

150 campuses. Shortly after the June meeting, Dr. Morton Baratz, the Association's General Secretary, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on S. 2525, the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act. Dr. Baratz was joined by President Derek Bok of Harvard University and Professor Richard Abrams of the University of California, Berkeley. The current and future relationships between the intelligence agencies and the academic community raise pressing issues for all concerned. We therefore take the opportunity to publish the revised remarks of Admiral Turner and the prepared statements of Dr. Baratz and President Bok.

MORTON S. BARATZ, General Secretary, AAUP
Statement before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, July 20, 1978


I am honored to be invited to testify before this Committee on the relations of the intelligence agencies to the academic community. S. 2525, the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978, is the most significant legislation affecting national intelligence activities considered by Congress since the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947. From this Committee's deliberations there will come, I am confident, a marked improvement in the body of law governing the intelligence system of the United States, which will assure effective intelligence activities consistent with preserving the integrity of other national institutions and professions.

Strong, effective national intelligence activities are in the national interest. Their strength and effectiveness can be enhanced with access to the energy, talents, skills, and physical resources housed in the nation's institutions of higher education.

An academic community known by all concerned to be devoted to the search for truth, wherever truth may lie, is also in the national interest. One necessary condition for assurance of the integrity of intellectual inquiry is insulation of scholars from those persons, groups, and institutions that have an interest either in suppressing relevant kinds of information or using it in ways that are antithetical to the pursuit of truth.

Are the respective imperatives of intelligence work and of scholarly inquiry irreconcilable? If not, what rules may be established and by whom to regulate the relationships between intelligence agencies and the academic community, such that legitimate national security objectives can be more nearly achieved without causing significant dilution of academic freedom and academic self-government?

The American Association of University Professors has, for the over sixty years of its existence, defended the academic freedom of teachers and scholars. We have done so not as some particular entitlement of teachers and scholars, but in service of the inestimable value of academic freedom to the na-



Morton S. Baratz testifies before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

tion. In the words of the 1940 *Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, a document endorsed by more than one hundred scholarly and educational organizations:

Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free expression.

The pursuit and expression of knowledge, the distinguishing characteristics of the academic community, must be open and independent. There must, in other words, be no justifiable suspicion that the academic profession is being used for nonprofessional purposes. Such suspicions would cast a pall of doubt over the activities of the academic profession and thus gravely reduce the benefits to society from teachers and scholars freely discussing, teaching, or publishing their views.

We realize that this Committee has an imposing task in deciding what is suitable and what is permissible for intelligence agencies in their relations with the academic community. What can and should be legislated, and what can and should be left to self-governance on the campus, are issues for which answers are hard to find. The AAUP believes firmly in the principle of self-governance by colleges and universities, and on that basis encourages their faculties and administrators to devise professional codes of ethics to guide members of the academic community in their relations with intelligence agencies. We also believe, however, that the law should delimit the claims that the intelligence agencies can legitimately make upon academics, lest the latter find themselves

asked by their government to do that which their professional obligations preclude.

Legislation consistent with maintaining the integrity of higher education as well as with facilitating the work of the intelligence agencies is possible and desirable. It is our view, however, that S. 2525 falls short of that kind of accommodation, in that it calls into substantial question the "free search for truth and its free expression" upon which the common good rests. Here is a quick listing of its defects:

(a) It draws an untenable distinction between the academic who travels abroad under the aegis of an academic institution and the academic whose travels are private. (b) It expressly fails to prohibit covert recruitment in academic institutions. (c) It leaves to tenuous implication whether restrictions on contracting by an intelligence agency with an academic institution apply as well to individual members of the academic profession. (d) It places limits upon disclosure of participation in United States organizations which allow covert intelligence activities among campus groups composed primarily of foreign students and foreign scholars.

Each of these points deserves further, but brief, discussion.

I

Section 132 of the Bill states that no intelligence agency may "pay or provide other valuable consideration" to a United States person travelling abroad as part of a government program "designed to promote education or the arts, humanities or cultural affairs" for purposes of intelligence activities or providing intelligence information, and no intelligence agency may use for purposes of cover any academic institution (subsection (a)(2) and (6)). These are welcome provisions. But Section 132 goes on to state that no entity of the intelligence community may use as a source of operational assistance in clandestine intelligence activities in foreign countries any individual who "is a United States person whose travel to such country is sponsored and supported by a United States academic institution unless the appropriate senior officials of such institution are notified that such person is being used for such purpose" (subsection (b)(2)).

Our first concern is with the word "unless" and the language which follows. "Appropriate senior officials" (identified, we assume, by the intelligence agency) are informed that an individual from their campus is being used for clandestine intelligence activities abroad. Presumably, then, the practice goes forward. The restriction on the intelligence agencies

in lines 17-19 of this subsection is, in effect, removed in lines 19-21. But a practice which is wrong is not made right by informing "appropriate senior officials." We urge the deletion of lines 19-21 so that the intention of the legislation with respect to a limitation upon intelligence agencies may be fully implemented.

We are also troubled that the limitation on the intelligence agencies against using members of the academic community travelling abroad does not extend to the individual whose travel is *not* "sponsored and supported by a United States academic institution" This distinction is, in our view, inappropriate and unworkable.

The individual who travels to a professional symposium in Greece with his own funds or funds provided by a foundation is no different in the eyes of his colleagues at home or those met abroad from the scholar sponsored and supported by an academic institution. Both seek to advance their own and others' knowledge of a field of study, and their institutional affiliations are widely publicized. An intelligence agency, however, may approach the academic who has arranged his own funding but not the dependent scholar, for use in operational activities in the foreign country. The clarity sought in S. 2525 does not exist, for what we understand this language seeks to avoid—taint of academic institutions through association with intelligence agencies in covert activities abroad—cannot be accommodated to the richly complex world of travelling academics.

There are, of course, scholars who travel as tourists, often with families, seeking recreation as any of us might. But we do not see, for the purposes of this legislation, a substantial difference between the scholar travelling privately and the scholar travelling professionally. Neither scholar is meaningfully separable from his institution. Unlike lawyers or physicians, most of whom are self-employed, but like legislators, whose professional identification is bound to an institution, the scholar abroad does not shed his institutional affiliation. It defines how he is perceived, whether or not his presence in a foreign country is sponsored and supported by an academic institution.

In 1976, the Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the AAUP called on all academics to "participate only in those government activities whose sponsorship is fully disclosed, and to avoid any involvement which might conflict with their academic obligations and responsibilities." The avoidance of a conflict of interest is an affirmative obligation resting upon academics to accept no responsibilities which would substantially interfere with their professional responsibilities. The

academic who consents to participate in clandestine activities abroad provides a cover for intelligence work. In doing so, the academic, as the Report of the Committee on Relationships between the Harvard Community and United States Intelligence Agencies observed, "casts doubt on the integrity of the efforts of the many American academics who work abroad and, as a practical matter, may make it more difficult for American academics to obtain permission to pursue their interests in foreign countries."

The academic who performs covert intelligence work thus assumes an obligation at odds with his obligations as a teacher and a scholar, for his secret activities inhibit professional relationships without which members of the academic profession may not effectively discharge their duties to students and colleagues. It follows, we believe, that that which is improper for an academic to accept and do consistent with professional ethical standards, it would be just as improper for intelligence agencies to induce.

We recommend that intelligence agencies be prohibited from using, as sources of operational assistance in foreign countries, *all* academics travelling abroad.

II

Section 132, subsection (f) states that intelligence agencies are not prohibited from using any person described in subsections (a) and (b) of this provision to aid in recruitment of employees, sources of information, and operational assistance for the intelligence community.

The wording of this subsection troubles us. If an intelligence agency may use the described persons (including clergy, journalists, and academics abroad) to assist in recruitment of sources of operational assistance, how is the constraint upon the agencies towards academics travelling in foreign countries to be maintained? We have no detailed knowledge of operational assistance programs, but we are hard pressed to understand how helping to *recruit* sources of operational assistance is distinguishable from being *used as a source* of operational assistance. Because the distinction in practice between the two is blurred, the limitation upon the intelligence agencies intended to safeguard the academic community is correspondingly weakened.

More troublesome, subsection (f) establishes a statutory mandate for covert recruitment on the campus. Open recruitment at colleges and universities by identifiable representatives of the intelligence agencies is unobjectionable. But the practice by intelligence agencies of maintaining confidential rela-

tionships with faculty members, students, or administrators for recruitment purposes is inconsistent with the requirement that all conflicts of interest which may affect teaching and scholarship be fully disclosed.

The unidentified member of the academic community who seeks the views of others for possible use by the intelligence agencies engages in false pretenses: he encourages reliance by others in his professional capacity for nonprofessional reasons. In so doing, he places *all* members of the academic community under suspicion. Thus, the unfettered exchange of ideas, central to free and independent institutions of higher learning, tends to be constrained, and the relationships that should exist in the academic community to the benefit of society, particularly those between students and faculty, are potentially distorted.

Further, we question if it is appropriate for the intelligence agencies to enlist the covert aid of a member of the academic community in activities that can result in a secret investigation of another member of the academic community, whether a United States citizen or foreign national, which may lead to additional secret government intrusion on the campus. We find nothing in S. 2525 that would restrain this possible conduct by government and are deeply troubled that information may be collected by the Executive Branch about persons at colleges and universities to be used in ways unknown to those persons and whose professional reputations and careers may, in consequence, be put at risk.

Foreign students and foreign scholars create special difficulties with respect to covert recruitment. These individuals are on our campuses in increasing number. It may be appropriate for the intelligence agencies, in pursuit of their responsibilities, to probe the views of foreign nationals or recruit their aid. But we believe it inappropriate for the intelligence agencies to use academics as a means of attaining their purposes. These practices, especially when conducted in secret on the campus, discredit the integrity of the academic profession in the same degree as covert recruitment on the campus directed against United States persons. We are concerned that any member of the academic community would consent to be part of this covert process. We are distressed that S. 2525 encourages such practices.

Accordingly, we urge that language be added to S. 2525 that prohibits the intelligence agencies from maintaining covert relationships with members of the academic community, whether witting or not, for purposes of recruitment in the United States and

abroad, and that recruitment on the campus by the intelligence agencies be confined to known representatives of the agencies whose names are made a matter of public record.

III

Section 139 places restrictions on contracting by an entity of the intelligence community with an academic institution, and allows no exception to revealing contract sponsorship with an academic institution. This restriction is an important and probably a necessary means of assuring access by the intelligence agencies to the best advice and knowledge which universities can offer, consistent with canons of institutional independence. The wording of the Section, however, leaves us uneasy in two respects and troubled in a third.

We understand that the intelligence agencies have established and funded independent establishments or proprietaries which enter contracts or arrangements with academic institutions. It is not clear if these kinds of establishments are envisioned as entities, part and parcel, of the intelligence community. We welcome clarification on this point, preferably through a definition of "entity of the intelligence community" in Section 104 ("Definitions") of the Bill.

Section 139 states that "entity sponsorship" is made known to "appropriate officials" of the academic institution. We assume that the intelligence agencies decide who and how many are "appropriate officials." It is plausible to suppose that the intelligence agencies will differ among themselves as to the meaning of "appropriate officials": the many different colleges and universities in this country, with their varied structures of governance, alone would secure this result. Our concern is that different practices in the context of a broad standard can readily defeat the purpose of the obligation to reveal contract sponsorship: to prevent conflicts of interest and thus protect the integrity of the objectives and needs of the cooperating institutions. Contract disclosure to "appropriate officials" by the intelligence agencies would, we suspect, be more likely to reflect prudential concern for the interests of the agencies than to achieve the purpose of disclosure. The likely result will be to inhibit disclosure of contract sponsorship.

To guard against this likelihood, we suggest the following language to conclude the sentence now ending on line 20 of Section 139, page 67: "... consistent with the normal rules governing contracts with outside sponsors as made known by the com-

pany or institution to the entity of the intelligence agency."¹

The more troubling aspect of Section 139 is that restrictions on contracting apply only to companies and institutions. Apparently individuals are excluded. The intelligence agencies are free to enter covert contract relationships with members of the academic community but not with academic institutions. We agree that it is important for the learning and expertise of members of the academic community to be available to the intelligence agencies. But we know of no compelling reason why this relationship should not be disclosed. Indeed, secrecy may work to the disadvantage of the intelligence agencies, for suspicions created about hidden contracts become a warning signal to individuals to avoid all contracts sponsored by the intelligence community. We thus recommend that the obligation of intelligence agencies to disclose contracts with institutions extend to individuals, and that the prohibition against concealing entity sponsorship apply to individual members of the academic community, as well as academic institutions.

IV

Finally, I invite your attention to Section 244, with its restrictions on undisclosed participation in United States organizations. Disclosure may be waived by the head or designee of an entity of an intelligence agency if an individual joins an organization which is "composed primarily of foreign persons and is acting on behalf of a foreign power." The definitions of foreign persons and foreign power under Title II of the Bill appear sufficiently broad to encompass any campus-based group in the United States composed primarily of foreign students and foreign scholars. An intelligence agency would thus be able, without disclosure, to ask a faculty member to join a group of colleagues (say, Korean nationals) in efforts to affect relationships between the United States and a foreign state (say, the Republic of Korea). But absent full disclosure, the practice undermines the necessary trust between students and scholars. Foreign nationals in our institutions of higher education are just as entitled to that assurance as United States nationals.

We recommend that language be added to Section 244 exempting academic institutions from the presently drafted waiver of disclosure.

¹ The bill now reads: "No entity of the intelligence community may enter into any contract or arrangement for the provision of goods or services with any private company or institution in the United States unless the entity sponsorship is known to appropriate officials of the company or institution."

V

The work of the intelligence agencies is an important part of America's efforts to live securely and peacefully in the world. Academic freedom and principles of professional ethics are essential to sustaining and expanding our democratic traditions and practices. For the most part, the intelligence community and the academic community pursue their responsibilities separately. Where they come together, the possibility for friction is high. Secrecy, necessarily woven into the fabric of intelligence activities, is basically antagonistic to the free and open exercise of teaching and inquiry by members of the academic profession.

S. 2525, in recognition that academic freedom holds a place of valued importance in our country, establishes protections—among them, a prohibition on intelligence agencies from using for purposes of cover any academic institution—to safeguard the academic community from indiscriminate use by the intelligence agencies. For the reasons stated, however, we believe these protections to be insufficient.

S. 2525, if enacted as presently drafted, will leave the door open to unacceptable intrusions by the intelligence agencies in colleges and universities throughout America. The free search for truth, the essential quality of the academic enterprise in a free society, will be compromised, the respect of others withdrawn, and the adverse consequences for society lasting.

We appreciate that our recommendations can lead to additional restrictions on the intelligence agencies in their performance of certain tasks. We are confident that the intelligence agencies can accomplish their vital functions within these restrictions: that the prohibition on intelligence agencies from using as a source of operational assistance in clandestine intelligence activities academics travelling in foreign countries "sponsored and supported by a United States academic institution" apply to all academics abroad; that the intelligence agencies be prohibited from entering covert relations with members of the academic community for recruitment purposes, and that all recruitment by the intelligence agencies in colleges and universities be open; that restrictions on contracting by an intelligence agency with an academic institution extend to individual teachers and scholars; and that the restriction on intelligence agencies to disclose participation in United States organizations not be waived with respect to academic institutions.

It is our firm conviction that these proposed revisions of S. 2525 are acceptable alternatives for na-

tional intelligence activities consistent with the proper functioning of the academic enterprise, so that the academic community and the intelligence community both may better serve the common good.

**DEREK C. BOK, President of Harvard University
Statement before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, July 20, 1978**

I appreciate the invitation to come before you today to discuss the activities of American intelligence agencies as they affect our universities. I think that I can contribute most directly to your deliberations by talking about the policies of my own university in this field and the differences that have arisen between Harvard and the Central Intelligence Agency.

In its 1976 report, a Select Committee of the Senate raised the question whether the integrity and professional standards of faculty members and institutions had been compromised or violated by some of the relationships existing between the academic and intelligence communities. The Select Committee also declared that it was the responsibility of the American academic community to set professional and ethical standards for its members with respect to intelligence activities.

In response to this suggestion and with the view that the problem needed careful thought, I appointed a committee at Harvard to study the specific issues raised by the Select Committee. In choosing the members of the committee, I appointed individuals who were respected within the University and experienced in both the academic and governmental communities. The members included Archibald Cox, Professor of Law; Henry Rosovsky, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences; Don Price, Dean of the School of Government; and Daniel Steiner, Counsel to the University.

After many months of study and consultation with interested parties, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Harvard committee issued a report. . . . The report began by listing several fundamental premises. Three of them deserve mention here:

First, in an era of international tension and conflict it is important for the United States to have an effective system of foreign intelligence.

Second, U.S. foreign intelligence efforts, like other forms of professional work and public service, can benefit considerably from the research and expertise that can be obtained from universities and their faculty members.

Third, the relationship between U.S. foreign intelligence agencies and universities must be structured in ways that protect the integrity of universities and the academic profession and safeguard the freedom and objectivity of scholarship.

With these three premises in mind, the committee considered the several questions raised by the Select Committee and recommended the following guidelines to govern relationships between the Harvard community and the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies:

1. Harvard may enter into research contracts with intelligence agencies provided that such contracts conform with Harvard's normal rules governing contracting with outside sponsors and that the existence of a contract is made public in the usual manner by University officials.

2. Individual members of the Harvard community may enter into direct or indirect consulting arrangements with intelligence agencies to provide research and analytical services. The individual should report in writing the existence of such an arrangement to the Dean of his or her Faculty, who should then inform the President.

President Derek C. Bok



3. Any member of the Harvard community who has an ongoing relationship with an intelligence agency as a recruiter should report that fact in writing to the Dean of the appropriate Faculty, who should inform the President of the University and the appropriate placement offices within the University. A recruiter should not recommend to an intelligence agency the name of another member of the Harvard community without the prior consent of that individual. Members of the Harvard community whose advice is sought on a one-time or occasional basis should consider carefully whether under the circumstances it is appropriate to give the agency the name of another member of the Harvard community without the prior consent of the individual.

4. Members of the Harvard community should not undertake covert intelligence operations for a government agency. They should not participate in propaganda activities if the activities involve lending their names and positions to gain public acceptance for materials they know to be misleading or untrue. Before undertaking any other propaganda activities, individuals should consider whether the task is consistent with their scholarly and professional obligations.

5. No member of the Harvard community should assist intelligence agencies in obtaining the unwitting services of another member of the Harvard community nor should such agencies employ members of the Harvard community in an unwitting manner.

These guidelines are now in effect at Harvard on an interim basis. In my opinion, they strike a sensible balance. On the one hand, they permit institutional and individual research and consulting arrangements that can benefit universities and individual academics and make available to intelligence agencies the intellectual resources of the University. On the other hand, they prohibit participation in covert recruiting on the campus and in operational activities of intelligence agencies.

It is with respect to these two activities—covert recruiting and operational activities—that significant differences of opinion have arisen between Harvard and the CIA. Over the past year, through staff discussions and correspondence with the CIA, we have unsuccessfully attempted to resolve these differences. . . . [The correspondence,] as well as direct discussions with the CIA, make it clear that the CIA plans to ignore these two central elements of our guidelines.

This disagreement between Harvard and the CIA in regard to covert recruiting and operational use of

academics raises fundamental questions that deserve consideration by this Committee.

Covert recruiting involves the secret use by the CIA of faculty members, administrators, and possibly students to identify individuals, primarily foreign nationals studying at U.S. universities, as likely candidates for employment or other service with the CIA on a regular or sporadic basis. In the course of serving as a covert recruiter of foreign nationals for the CIA, a professor will presumably use the various means at his disposal to put together information for the CIA. For example, in a seminar discussion the professor might probe the student's views on international affairs to advise the CIA with respect to the student's attitudes. In a counselling session the professor might ask questions about the student's financial situation, not for the purpose of helping the student but to provide additional information to the CIA that might be useful in obtaining the student's services. Professors might invite students to social occasions in order to observe the student and gain background information of use to the CIA.

In these ways, recruiters become part-time covert agents of the CIA who use their positions as professors or administrators to identify foreign nationals on U.S. campuses who may be useful to the CIA. Such covert recruiting is highly inappropriate. A university community depends upon trust and candor to promote the free and open exchange of ideas and information essential to inquiry and learning. This atmosphere of trust has already been threatened by the widespread belief that certain foreign governments employ agents to observe and report on the views and behavior of their nationals enrolled as foreign students on American campuses. If it is known that our professors may also be observing foreign students and reporting on them to American intelligence agencies, the free exchange of views will be weakened still further.

As educators, we must be particularly sensitive to the interests of our students. Many of these students are highly vulnerable. They are frequently young and inexperienced, often short of funds and away from their homelands for the first time. Is it appropriate for faculty members, who supposedly are acting in the best interests of the students, to be part of a process of recruiting such persons to engage in activities that may be hazardous and probably illegal under the laws of their home countries? I think not.

The operational use of academics abroad raises equally serious questions. Put most simply, a professor's academic status is used as a cover to engage in activities which presumably include collecting in-

telligence on instructions from the CIA, performing introductions on behalf of the CIA, playing a role in a covert CIA activity, or participating in some other way in CIA operations. Continuation of this kind of activity will be harmful to the academic enterprise. As stated in the report of the Harvard committee, the operational use of academics "inevitably casts doubt on the integrity of the efforts of the many American academics who work abroad and, as a practical matter, may make it more difficult for American academics to pursue their interests in foreign countries." If the CIA will not use Fulbright-Hays scholars for operational purposes, as I understand is the case, I see no reason for the CIA to use other scholars for such purposes. If your own draft legislation prevents intelligence agencies from paying academic personnel for providing information acquired while participating in a U.S. government program abroad, I see no reason why the CIA should enlist the services of academics travelling abroad on other scholarly missions. The same considerations apply in all these situations.

A decade ago, one scholar revealed that his research findings in Nepal had, unknown to him, been regularly reported to the CIA. Thereafter, the work of other professors in India became suspect; requests to do research were subject to long delays; and efforts to work in sensitive areas of the country were blocked. As this example reveals, when the CIA uses professors for a variety of operational tasks, the motives and actions of all scholars abroad become suspect. Answers to inquiries are likely to be guarded; access is likely to be restricted. The apprehension of one professor for engaging in an illegal activity in a foreign country may well result in the total exclusion of other scholars. At that point it will be too late to repair the damage. In the interest of scholarship, therefore, it would be most welcome if the CIA stopped using academic personnel for covert intelligence activities before further incidents take place.

In correspondence with me, the CIA has advanced three arguments to justify its refusal to respect our guidelines.

First, the CIA believes that it has unfairly been singled out as the object of special restrictions. In fact, our report expressly covers all U.S. intelligence agencies. We have not extended such restrictions to other institutions that recruit on our campus only because we have no reason to believe that corporations or other private institutions are either using our professors for covert intelligence activities or recruiting our students for unusually hazardous assignments or for activities that may be illegal under the laws of another nation.

Second, the CIA asserts that our guidelines interfere unjustifiably with the freedom of individual professors and employees to offer their services to the government. Harvard is not eager to impose a moral code on the behavior of its faculty and staff. Like all institutions, however, Harvard does claim the right to promulgate rules which prevent behavior that may compromise its mission or adversely affect the activities of other members of its community. As I have previously pointed out, we have drafted our present rules because we consider them necessary to preserve the integrity of our scholarly activities abroad and the atmosphere of candor and trust that is essential to the free exchange of ideas. The interests protected by our guidelines are important to everyone who seeks to learn and do research in the University.

Third, the CIA has argued that it must disregard our guidelines in the interests of national security. Let us be clear about exactly what this argument implies. Although the CIA emphasizes the "immense benefits we receive from extensive relationships with scholars and academic institutions throughout the country," it insists upon the right to use financial inducements or other means of persuasion to cause our professors and employees to ignore our rules of employment and enter into secret relationships whenever it considers such activities to be justified by the interests of national security.

I do not believe that an agency of the United States should act in this fashion. A Senate committee has called upon the academic community to set standards to govern its relations with the intelligence agencies. Harvard has attempted to set such standards. Yet the CIA is declaring that it will simply ignore essential provisions of our guidelines.

Essentially, our common task is to strike a proper balance between the needs of intelligence agencies in promoting our national security and the interests of the academic community in preserving conditions essential to learning and inquiry. The CIA may have special knowledge of our intelligence needs. But the CIA is hardly the appropriate arbiter to weigh these needs against the legitimate concerns of the academic community. It has no special knowledge of universities nor does it have the experience to weigh the intangible values involved in maintaining the integrity of the scholarly enterprise or an atmosphere of candor and trust on the nation's campuses. In addition, as an agency dedicated to the pursuit of intelligence activities, it cannot claim to have complete objectivity in weighing its own needs against the interests of a separate class of institutions.

I recognize that similar arguments can be applied

to universities. As the representative of an educational institution, I cannot claim to have expert knowledge of our intelligence needs nor can I pretend to have complete objectivity where academic interests are at stake. But it is an extraordinary step for a government agency to assert the right to interfere with the relations between an institution and its employees and to disregard the internal rules that an institution has developed to safeguard its essential activities. Such decisions should be made only under the express authority of the Congress and only on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.

If Congress finds that such evidence exists and that the national security requires its agencies to act in disregard of our rules, we must, of course, submit to such a judgment. But I believe that the evidence will be of a different nature. I suspect that careful examination will show that covert recruiting and the operational use of academic personnel may make the job of the CIA somewhat easier but that such methods are not essential to carrying out its intelligence function. If this is the case, Congress should make it clear that these activities cannot continue, and that the internal rules of academic institutions should be respected. The added effort and inconvenience required of the CIA to carry out its mission should be an acceptable price to pay in order to preserve the integrity of the academic profession, the independence of our educational institutions, and the atmosphere of openness and trust essential to free inquiry and learning.

**ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency**

In thinking about being here with you today, I was struck by the number of ways in which our professions are similar. In intelligence, as in the academic world, good research, digging out information, is the essential foundation of our work. Through the analyses and interpretation of that information, both communities add to the fund of available knowledge. By a commitment to publish its work, both make it available to those who need it so that better conclusions can be reached in many lines of work. And in our country, in the nongovernmental sector, there is a greater concentration of research skills as identified by advanced degrees in the academic community than anywhere else; in the governmental sector, that kind of concentration can be found in the in-



Stansfield Turner

telligence community where there is a greater concentration of Ph.D.'s than anywhere else in the government. This commonality means, in my view, that we have between us a serious foundation for understanding and the basis for a more comfortable, more mutually supportive relationship than has existed in recent years.

I believe that a more mutually supportive relationship between the intelligence and academic communities is particularly important to the United States today. Good intelligence is more important than it has been at any time since World War II. Your contribution to it can be significant and entirely proper.

Thirty years ago the United States held absolute military superiority in the world. Today, we are in a condition of near military parity. Clearly, the leverage gained by knowing the military capabilities and intentions of other nations is much more important when military forces are nearly equal than when there is no competition. Thirty years ago we were relatively independent economically. Today we are clearly interdependent with many other countries. It is much more important today that we know what is happening and what is going to happen in the economic sphere than it was thirty years ago. Thirty years ago we were a dominant political power. Many smaller nations took their cue from us automatically. Today not only do those nations eschew any other nation's leadership, but the number of them has grown. You can pick up your newspaper any morn-

ing and read about a country that did not exist a decade ago.

Given the need for more information and a broader spectrum of information, why must we resort to clandestine intelligence to obtain it? In fact, the intelligence community does research open sources to the maximum extent possible. Unfortunately, other nations do not make it as easy for us to learn about them as we do. The openness of our society permits the rest of the world to know in considerable detail what we think, what we are doing, and what we plan to do. With this information they can anticipate our actions and plan their counter-strategies. Closed societies, and there are many in this world, do not share this kind of information with others. Yet the activities of these closed societies can have tremendous impact on our military, political, and economic well-being.

Would any thinking American consider concluding an agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union if he could not be assured that somehow we could check, could verify, whether that agreement was being carried out? This is not a question of whether one trusts the Soviets or has confidence that they will do what they say. The stakes are simply too high for any country to put its total faith in the hands of some other country without any ability to assure itself that promises are being kept.

The same is true with the many other negotiations in which our government is engaged today in an attempt to reduce the threshold, the probability, of resort to arms. Strategic balance, force reductions in Europe, antisatellite negotiations, a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons testing, reductions in conventional arms sales around the world, all of these are possible because the intelligence community can assure our government that our information in these areas is good enough to verify the good faith of the other side in carrying out any agreement that may be reached.

But much more than the military sphere is at stake. Our country stands for increased international economic growth, for narrowing the gap between the underprivileged and the privileged nations. Here, too, good economic information is indispensable. It is not to our advantage to be caught by surprise when a closed society like the Soviet Union enters the grain market as it did in 1973. When this occurs, free world economies are disrupted and your pocketbook and mine are directly affected.

A study we did last summer on the future of the Soviet economy is an example of the kind of economic work we are doing. That estimate said that the

Soviets will have economic problems in the decade ahead, problems which will generate pressures that will prevent them from entering the international market as much as they do today. A study on the international energy situation predicted that over the next decade the demand for oil will be greater than the amount we can physically get out of the ground. The reserves are there, but we will be unable to extract quantities adequate to meet the growing demand. Therefore, there will not only be increased pressure on prices, but economic growth will be restricted.

If we are going to combat international terrorism successfully, as we would like to do in this country, there is no substitute for our physically penetrating international terrorist organizations to find out what they are doing. If we want to combat international drug trafficking, we must do the same kinds of things. In the international sphere, whether one is an interventionist or an isolationist—or falls somewhere in between—good information is essential as a base for sound policy. Consequently, this country must have some organization, call it the CIA or whatever you will, that can operate overseas both openly and clandestinely to acquire the information that policymakers need.

This situation is no different from what it was in the past. Today, however, the rules and the players have changed. The United States intelligence community is under the tightest controls and is operating more openly than ever before. We are in the process of evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence, and, I believe, we must be judged on the basis of this new model rather than on a popular but often inaccurate stereotype.

As the Director of Central Intelligence, I have been given strengthened and, in some cases, new authorities to bring together all intelligence activities. I am convinced that the intelligence community must, and I am determined that it will, conform to the laws of the land and to our society's ethical standards as well. I am committed to full cooperation with oversight bodies, some of which are entirely new in the last couple of years. The major oversight bodies are to be found in the executive branch and in Congress.

In the executive branch there are the President and the Vice President, who today take an active and strong interest in intelligence activities and exercise close supervision over them. Also in the executive branch is the Intelligence Oversight Board which is composed of three distinguished citizens, appointed by the President and reporting only to him, who are not otherwise connected with intelligence activities.

You, any citizen, or any of my employees can communicate directly with that Board to report what they believe to be illegal or improper activity by me or anyone in the intelligence community. The Board will investigate that allegation and report its findings directly to the President.

Finally, there are two new and very rigorous committees of the Congress, each dedicated exclusively to intelligence oversight: one in each chamber. They interrogate me closely, and I provide them with detailed information on what we are doing.

In addition to this, I look very much on the American public as a control on intelligence activities. Consequently, we respond more forthrightly to the media today. We attend more academic conferences and symposia. Our analysts write papers supporting your activities. We speak in public more, participate in panels like this, and publish more. We publish whenever we can reasonably declassify a piece of analytic work and after declassification believe that it has value to the public. Any university that is not subscribing to the full range of analytic publications put out by the CIA from the Library of Congress—an average of two a week—is missing one of the greatest source bargains I know.

At the same time, the Freedom of Information Act and our own vigorous declassification program further increase the quantity of information moving into the public sector. These are not public-relations gimmicks. By reducing the corpus of genuinely sensitive information, we simplify our job of safeguarding the secrets which remain; by sharing with you, we hope we are building understanding and subsequently support for the job that we do. In any case, these efforts are based on the sincere conviction that the better informed the American public is on issues of national importance, the better we are serving the nation and the stronger our democracy will be.

We want particularly, however, to rebuild a productive and proper relationship with the academic community. On the one hand, we need you. As with any research organization, we need critical outside scrutiny to ask: Are you missing the woods for the trees? Are you making the same old and perhaps erroneous assumptions year after year? Are you mired in your way of thinking? Is your analysis rigorous enough? On the other hand, we believe we have something to offer you in return. We are an untapped source of valuable primary information to the academic community. Our new and sophisticated technical means of collecting intelligence offer all kinds of potential for you as well as for us. For example, I recently learned that our photographic capa-

bility promises tremendous benefits to archeologists. Excellent photography, a capability which is expensive to develop and carry out, exists in the intelligence community. With this capability, archeological ruins that would otherwise be politically or geographically inaccessible become accessible. And, even when sites are accessible, details not noticed at ground level become apparent when viewed from above. We are eager to share what we can in spheres like this.

However, since we cannot operate in a vacuum, your knowledge and expertise are important to us. It would be irresponsible to risk lives and spend money to go overseas and clandestinely collect information which is openly available within our own society. To try to keep abreast of what you and other Americans learn in your work and travels around the world, we endeavor to keep lines of communication open. This includes informal consulting in areas of political, economic, and scientific expertise. I would note here that the Church Committee saw no danger in relationships such as these to individuals or to the integrity of American private institutions. In fact, the Church Committee report stressed the benefits, to both the government and the universities, of continuing these contacts.

Beyond that, we have formal, contractual, paid relationships with individuals and institutions for consulting or providing information. These are open relationships unless the person with whom we contract wants them to be kept confidential. In the case of academics, we urge that responsible officials of the university be informed of the relationship. Whether or not that is done is the decision of the academic. Clearly, the relationship between an individual professor and the university where he is employed is a relationship between them and not between us and the university.

If a university requires that all outside commitments of its faculty be reported to the administration, we fully support the position that a relationship with the CIA should be no exception. However, we disagree that a relationship with the CIA should be singled out as unique, and the only one that need be reported, as it is in the Harvard guidelines. This assumes that only a relationship with the CIA could endanger an academic's or a school's integrity. With all the opportunities for conflict of interest today, I think that is a naive assumption. Faculty guidelines as conceived or modified to meet the individual needs of the over 3,000 institutions of higher learning in the United States are ultimately internal to the community to which they apply. To expect every po-

tential employer from either the private or the government sector also to abide by these internal guidelines and their multifarious subtleties is unrealistic. That not being practical, then some may urge that the employer himself be regulated in the nature of contacts which may be made with the academic community. In the case of the intelligence community, that might be done by legislative action. I contend that while this may seem a viable and desirable means of controlling and perhaps restricting intelligence community access to the academic community, this control could not work just one way. The access of the academic community to government would thereby also be restricted. The loss in both directions would be far greater than the gain.

Beyond exchange of information in both directions, it should be obvious that the intelligence community is just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community itself on recruiting the best university graduates. We cannot subsist over time without an annual infusion of relatively few, but high quality, American university graduates. Although we are denied the right of free and open communication and association on a few campuses, we recruit openly today on about 150 different campuses along with businesses and other government agencies. The occasional recommendation of students by staff or faculty members is no different from the confidential recommendations regularly prepared on students by staff and faculty for admission to graduate school or consideration for nongovernment employment.

Additionally, the CIA needs to contract with some very few of the 120,000 foreign students in our country. Despite emotional allegations to the contrary, I

assure you that all such contracts are entered into with the full knowledge of the student, and without coercion. They are often the result of our being sought out rather than the other way around, and they are entirely a matter of free choice on the part of the individual foreign student. The confidentiality of these relationships is not unusual when viewed in the light of this being the students' personal business.

Let me sum up by saying that in our country today intelligence operates under two imperatives: The first is to recognize that the juxtaposition of open and closed societies in our world has real dangers or risks for the open societies. None of us here would trade the short-term advantages that accrue to a closed society for the blessings of openness and respect for the individual inherent in our system, and we all have faith that ours is a long-term strength of great advantage. But at the same time we cannot be so naive as to think that we can forego collecting information about these closed societies without giving them undue and unnecessary advantage.

The second imperative is to recognize that the basic purpose of intelligence is to support and to defend the free institutions of our country. We attempt to do that by providing the most comprehensive, the most reliable information that we can to the President, to the Congress, and, to some extent, to the American public so that the best decisions for all of us can be made. In my view it would make no sense whatsoever for the intelligence community to jeopardize any of those free institutions in the process of collecting that information. I assure you that we are dedicated to conducting intelligence in the United States in ways that will only strengthen the basic institutions and standards of this country.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 40-43

THE NATION
20 January 1979

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Failure of Intelligence

NORMAN BIRNBAUM

The failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to predict the upheaval in Iran prompted the President to send handwritten notes of complaint to national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner and Secretary of State Vance. The agencies headed by each proceeded to demonstrate that, however limited their view of the world, they were unerring analysts of one another's mistakes. The C.I.A.'s explanation for reporting that all was for the best in the Shah's best of all possible worlds was that it had been ordered by the White House and the State Department to talk only to the Savak. The State Department grumbled that the White House had rejected its warnings about growing political unrest in Iran. Dr. Brzezinski, apparently recalling that December is term-paper time, gave the State Department's research failing marks. Then, to close the circle, the President himself was held by *The New York Times* to be not entirely blameless on the ground that he had seen in Iran only what he wanted to see.

The President, at least, should console himself; the failure of our national security apparatus to provide Presidents with adequate intelligence is hardly new. I recollect a chat in John Kennedy's White House with a distinguished member of that Administration. It was in July of 1961, and he produced that day's *Washington Post*, with a headlined report by the late Isaac Deutscher on an alleged conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Was Deutscher, he asked, to be taken seriously? Deutscher, I replied, was a Marxist working alone in Hampstead, London, and occasionally talking to East Europeans. You, I continued, have the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the State Department, electronic eavesdropping and much, much more. Precisely, was the reply, that is why I need Deutscher.

The "intelligence" failure in Iran is, of course, a failure of policy. A decision having been made to back the Shah, the very attempt to establish alternative sources of information became an implicit disavowal of him. In a world in which appearances ("signals") is the customary word, with its original denotation of a very primitive mode of communication) are everything, ignoring questions of substance is not an oversight; it is an imperative. Dr. Brzezinski is said to have argued that the question of human rights was

important, but secondary to the necessity of maintaining a friendly Iranian Government in a very strategic country. He did so despite the growing evidence that his adherence to a supposedly pragmatic position required a very large leap of faith. The purchase of friendship from an Iranian Government opposed by the nation assured the primacy of the issue of human rights in Iran. With friends like the Shah, his generals and policemen, we clearly do not need enemies.

Familiar themes, which hardly bear repeating—but for a terrible suspicion. Suppose our elites actually take the anti-world of appearances, messages, signals, and international gamesmanship for the real one? Elites, after all, suffer alternately from two severe disorders. One is their conviction of omnipotence. The other is their panicked sense of helplessness. Bureaucrats long for a predictable world in which even (or above all) enemies stick to their (the bureaucrats') scripts. The world's stubborn refusal to conform to position papers is a constant disappointment—and, worse, a source of endless anxiety. Fantasies of total order ward off fears of complete catastrophe but, since order inevitably breaks down, also generate them. Bureaucratic inventiveness is, however, limitless—when the problem is staying on top. The doctrine of "crisis management" was invented to circumvent these difficulties. It offers surcease from the dreadful cycle to which reality condemns those who would rule. It obviates the necessity for that vision of history, or knowledge of history, which contemporary elites so conspicuously lack. The doctrine is fraudulent. Like the legendary generals fighting the last war, most elites manage new crises with techniques learned in old ones. Most crises, in any event, will not respond to technique alone.

It is unfair to depict our elites as entirely devoid of thought. They possess a philosophy of history, in the form of the doctrine of "modernization," most recently applied to Iran. The Shah, we are assured, was "modernizing" Iran. The notion of "modernization" was developed by academic social scientists anxious to explain and justify our postwar empire. The world was bound to become like the United States, if not more so. Nations once backward would attain that secular utopia, a society of consumer-citizens. Indeed, in truly modern nations citizens would consume more, and think less. Politics would be the reserved domain of technocratic elites, subject to occasional approbation by grateful publics—whose maturity could be measured by the intensity of their gratitude.

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AMERICAN COUNCIL ON ED
ONE DUPONT CIRCLE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(202) 833-4710

June 29, 1978

Mr. Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Thank you for a most informative day. We obviously share the concern to improve relations between the Agency and the academy. I am heartened to see that we also share a sensitivity to the fine, critically important line between appropriate and inappropriate relationships.

Cordially,


J. W. Peltason

JWP:raa

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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Office of the President
202 Morrill Hall
100 Church Street S.E.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455

June 26, 1978

*Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

You beat me to the punch, as I wanted to write you and express my thanks for a most stimulating and informative day with you and your senior colleagues. I came away impressed in many positive ways, but particularly was struck both by the sensibleness of your views and attitudes (and those of your key associates) on our nation's intelligence needs in general, and by your commitment to candor and openness and reasonable citizen awareness of the role and functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency.

At this time, I have no further questions nor any additional thoughts on the relationship between the Agency and the academic community. If I do, I will pass them along one way or another.

Finally, on a personal note, I enjoyed very much the opportunity to talk with you about a range of stimulating matters. I sincerely hope that our paths cross again in the future.

With all best wishes.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'C. Peter Magrath'.

C. Peter Magrath
President

CPM:rw

NASHVILLE BANNER

22 June 1978

Reports On CIA Recruiting Do Not Concern Colleges

By PEGGY REISSER
Banner Staff Writer

There appears to be little concern at local colleges over reports that the CIA has been conducting secret recruitment of foreign students on U.S. campuses.

The recruitment activities, involving 150 colleges, were confirmed last week by CIA Director Stansfield Turner at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors.

Turner would not disclose which campuses were involved or what the foreign students were being recruited to do.

He did say that "very few" of the 120,000 foreign students in the United States are under contract to the agency.

Only a few local foreign students said they have been approached in the past by someone they believed was a recruiter from the CIA.

For instance, one Vanderbilt graduate student from Algeria, who asked not to be identified, said that two years ago he was offered \$100 to write a paper about his country.

The offer came from a man who said he represented a multinational corporation. The student said he believes the man was with the CIA.

Administrators at Nashville colleges said they have no knowledge of any secret or open recruitment of foreign students on their campuses.

"I have not had it brought to my attention in relation to our students," Joan Elliot, foreign student advisor at Tennessee State University, said.

James Worley, director of the economic development program at Vanderbilt, said he "would be surprised if the CIA were on the campus."

The recruiting of foreign students is usually accomplished by direct contact between the recruiters and the students, Lynn Snuffer, with the Washington-based Campaign to Stop Government Spying, said. It is also conducted through faculty members who are asked the names of potential recruits, she said.

In the past, the CIA has recruited American students at colleges through the placement offices.

Students were recruited to work at the agency's headquarters, but none has been recruited here in the past few years, college officials say.

THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
19 June 1978

25X1


Turner Says the CIA Recruits Foreign Students in U.S., Defends Agency's Use of Professors

By ELLEN K. COUGHLIN

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, says his agency is recruiting "a few" of the more than 200,000 foreign students in this country, but that the contacts are "without coercion, entirely free, and entirely a matter of choice" for the students.

Addressing the annual meeting here of the American Association of University Professors, Mr. Turner said the recruitment of foreign students and professors on U. S. campuses was no more secret than the recruiting done by business organizations or



Morton Halperin, a critic of the Central Intelligence Agency, questions Stansfield Turner, its director, at professors' meeting.

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN

78-14341

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President
PETER O. STEINER
University of Michigan

June 19, 1978

Associate Secretary
JONATHAN KNIGHT

General Secretary
MORTON S. BARATZ
Washington Office


Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

On behalf of Peter Steiner, I wish to express our deep appreciation for the important contribution you made to the panel on the relationship between the CIA and the academic community at our Annual Meeting in New Haven. You entered the lion's den and emerged unscathed. We are grateful for your provocative and helpful discussion and for making the panel a highpoint of the Meeting.

With many thanks for your signal effort.

Sincerely,


Jonathan Knight

JK:vdw

cc: Professor Peter Steiner

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AMHERST COLL
AMHERST, MASSACHUSETTS 01002

The President

413-542-2234
413-542-2000

June 14, 1978

Dear Stan Turner:

No more than a bread-and-butter note, a word of thanks, personally and professionally, for taking part in that panel on the C.I.A. at the meeting of the A.A.U.P. I won't congratulate you on doing a good job, because I expect you to do a good job. The best compliment I can pay you is slightly different: you allow me to think better of the Agency and our government because you are in the position you are in. To be in charge of the Mediterranean must seem a relaxed responsibility in comparison to the present demands upon you.

Again, many thanks. It was a matter of pride for me to share a platform with you.

Cordially,

John William Ward

John William Ward

Stansfield Turner, Admiral, U. S. Navy
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

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3 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AV

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM All Things Considered...

STATION WETA Radio
NPR Network

DATE June 14, 1978

5:00 PM

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT CIA Recruitment on American Campuses

BOB EDWARDS: Last Saturday, the American Association of University Professors held a meeting in New Haven, Connecticut to discuss the issue of recruitment on American campuses by the Central Intelligence Agency. And CIA Director Stansfield Turner revealed during that meeting that the CIA was openly recruiting foreign students who are attending U.S. schools to be used as information sources when they returned home. Turner supplied that information in answer to a question from Morton Halperin, who was also a panel member representing the Center for National Security Studies.

This afternoon, NPR's Noah Adams talked with Halperin about Turner's statement.

NOAH ADAMS: Can we call this an admission?

MORTON HALPERIN: Yes.

ADAMS: It's the first time he's said it.

HALPERIN: I was surprised not by the fact. I was surprised by the fact that he was willing to admit it publicly.

ADAMS: And said it's open as recruitment as, say, IBM would come on to a campus.

HALPERIN: Well, no. He's saying that both -- everybody recruits secretly as well as openly. And what Admiral Turner said was that the CIA has a clandestine network, or a secret network of relationships with university professors and others at universities which it uses to help identify and to recruit foreign students.

ADAMS: And what's your basic concern about this? What's

CIA director asks for better cooperation with universities

From Caroline Davidson
in New York

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency has begun to campaign hard for better relations and increased cooperation between the academic world and the US intelligence community.

At the weekend, after a week of Senate cross-examination about Cuban activities in Africa, Admiral Stansfield Turner came to Yale to address the American Association of University Professors. The association, America's largest organisation of college and university teachers and research students, has been highly critical of CIA activities on the campus.

Admiral Turner told the association that the US had lost its former military, economic, and political pre-eminence. The world was growing increasingly complex, and a "mutually supported relationship between the CIA and the academic community" was more important than ever before.

Academics had helped intelligence agencies in the past by recruiting American and for-

sign students, providing information on an informal basis and undertaking paid research. This should continue in the future, Admiral Turner said. Such cooperation defended democracy and freedom, helped to prevent war, and was a contribution towards narrowing the gap between rich and poor countries.

When challenged, Admiral Turner defended the CIA's right to recruit among America's brightest graduates in competition with business and other organisations without restrictions. He said the CIA recruited "very few" of the 120,000 foreign students in American higher education. He also argued that it was wasteful for intelligence agencies to gather information by clandestine means overseas when it could be obtained by talking to academics at home.

Admiral Turner said there were many ways the CIA could help academics in return. Existing publishing programmes could be extended and information declassified more quickly. Scholars would also benefit from some CIA technology: archaeologists, for example, could use the latest aerial sur-

vey techniques in identifying and studying new sites. He did not discuss any financial reward.

Answering questions about CIA activities on campus threatening academic freedom, Admiral Turner said academics working for the CIA were not victims of coercion and were free to declare their connection publicly if they chose.

Admiral Turner, who became CIA Director in March, 1977, told the AAUP he wanted to establish a new model of intelligence for the US. Intelligence agencies should be as open as possible and subject to many different supervisory controls. All intelligence agents should be accountable for their actions, adding that he was personally involved in writing a code of ethics for the profession.

In many ways, Admiral Turner, who has overall responsibility for all US intelligence, got off lightly. He was not pressed to explain the apparent suppression of university research — in certain sensitive areas, such as computer security, by the National Security Agency, a sister body to the CIA.

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ON PAGE A7

THE WASHINGTON STAR (Green Line)
12 June 1978

Turner Reveals Agency Efforts

Foreign Students Recruited At U.S. Colleges by CIA

NEW HAVEN, Conn. (UPI) — CIA Director Stansfield Turner says his agency is recruiting foreign students attending U.S. colleges, but "very few" of the 120,000 foreign students in the United States are under contract to the agency.

Turner told a panel discussion Saturday night at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors that recruiting is conducted both openly and secretly on more than 150 college campuses across the country.

He said he was making his first public remarks on the subject to improve relations between the CIA and colleges, but he would not disclose what the students were recruited to do.

"I'm sorry to have to tell you there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free association," Turner said.

He said, "The CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in

our country... very few of the 120,000 of these students.

"Let me assure you all such contracts are without coercion, entirely free and entirely a matter of choice," Turner added.

He likened the campus recruiting to that done by business.

"We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies," he said.

Most of Turner's remarks were made in response to questions from CIA critic and panel member Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies.

Halperin said he thought it wrong the CIA doesn't always tell potential recruits they are candidates before approaching them with a contract.

"Every one of you every year, I suspect," Turner said to the attending delegates, "gets a number of letters asking who is a good graduate student, or who would be a good professor to be head of a department at another university."

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ON PAGE A-20

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 June 1978

CIA Defends Recruiting Of Foreigners on Campus

NEW HAVEN, Conn. (AP)—Central Intelligence Agency Director Stansfield Turner said Saturday that the CIA recruits foreigners studying or teaching in the United States, but with no more secrecy than private business recruiting.

Turner told a meeting of the American Association of University Professors that the CIA seeks information sources "openly" on about 150 U.S. campuses.

Responding to a question by CIA critic Morton Halperin, who appeared on the same panel, Turner said the intelligence agency recruits "a few out of the 120,000" foreigners studying or teaching in this country.

"It is no more secretive than any of the other recruiting that we do," he added.

He told the audience of several hundred AAUP members that it was his first public statement about CIA recruitment of foreigners on U.S. campuses.

Questioned by Halperin about inquiries made without the knowledge of potential sources, Turner said the CIA recruiting process is no different from that of private businesses and universities. Recruiters often look for

the best possible employees before approaching them directly, he said.

The CIA needs more assistance from the academic community in gathering information about "closed" foreign governments, he added. He criticized those who assume faculty members will be "tarnished if they associate with the CIA."

In response to questions about how faculty members working for the CIA should conduct themselves, Turner said he has been working for more than a year with a faculty leader from a "leading university" writing a specific code of ethics.

After the meeting he declined to identify the person.

THE NEW HAVEN REGISTER
11 June 1978

CIA Recruits Foreign Students On U.S. Campuses, Turner Admits

By DIANE ZAVRAS
Staff Reporter

The Central Intelligence Agency does hire foreign students on U.S. campuses but "without coercion," CIA Director Stansfield Turner disclosed Saturday.

"The CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country. . . very few of the 120,000 of these students," he told more than 500 faculty delegates at the national convention of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) here.

Turner, who said he was making his first public remarks on the issue of recruiting foreigners in the nation's colleges, contended methods used were "no more secretive in my opinion than much of the other recruiting that is done" in academe.

But, he said, "Let me assure you all such contracts are without coercion, entirely free and entirely a matter of choice."

On the general issue of recruiting, Turner, who was largely responding to questions from CIA critic Morton Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, said, "We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies."

He added, "I'm sorry to have to tell you there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free association."

Turner contended that it "should be very obvious" the intelligence agency is "just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community on recruiting good U.S. students."

He told delegates attending the 64th annual AAUP convention that Halperin thought it was wrong when individuals are not informed they are being considered for CIA positions.

Yet, Turner said, "Everyone of you every year, I suspect, gets a number of letters asking who is a good graduate student, or who would be a good professor to be head of a department at another university."

"We recruit just like everybody else does. Some of it is open, some of it is not."

Amherst College President John William Ward felt freelance faculty ties should be known to college administrations.

Turner agreed that if colleges like Ward's require "all outside commitments of academic members be reported to the administration, the CIA should be no exception."

He would disagree, he said, if the CIA relationship "should be singled out as it is in the Harvard guidelines which assume only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity."

"And with all the opportunities today for conflict of interest, we think that is a naive assumption."

On operations, Turner pointed to the incompatibility of "having good intelligence and having 100 percent openness" and noted it was not the intelligence unit alone that had secrets.

"In the academic community, Ph.D. researchers certainly don't share their research before they publish it," he said.

"All of us have the problem of where we draw the line between complete public inspection of our activities and some degree of secrecy," he said. "We have been drawing it further and further in this country."

The AAUP Saturday approved a resolution submitted by the California delegation asking Gov. Edmund G. Brown Jr. to guarantee due process to faculty members whose jobs are threatened by budget cuts following last week's stunning Proposition 13 vote.

California faculty spokesmen had indicated earlier the governor may target the four-year public campuses of the University of California and California State University in \$300 million cuts sought because he considers higher education a "discretionary" rather than mandatory item.

Some 3,300 positions at California State alone may be in jeopardy, according to June Pollak, AAUP coordinator there.

A national AAUP stance was prompted partly by worry among delegations at the convention that what happens in California as a result of the historic referendum, which drastically pared property tax revenues, could reverberate through many other states and public university campuses.

The faculty group from the State University of New York notably endorsed the measure with the reminder that it had already gone through retrenchment which resulted in layoffs two years ago.

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American Association of University

Third Speaker - Morton Halperin

I appreciate this second opportunity to speak to you although I must say that hearing these two rather clear and somewhat classical statements of the two positions, I feel a little bit like the donkey in the famous story of the man who was visiting in Eastern Europe and had to get to a small village over the mountains. Not knowing how to go he hired a guide who arrived early in the morning in a wagon pulled by a donkey. They set off to a village over the mountains and they got to the first mountain and the donkey refused to go up. So the guide got out and he pulled the donkey up the mountain. They got to the second mountain and the same thing happened. At the third mountain as they got out the man said to his guide, I'm here because I have to get to the next village, you are here because you're guiding me, but tell me why did you bring the donkey? I want to say that I agree very much with what Admiral Turner said about the importance in research of an independent intelligence agency which provides that research to the Executive Branch, to the Congress and to the public. And I agree also on the importance of cooperation between the academic community and the CIA in the conduct of that research. But that seems to me to make it even more imperative that we "anti" the improper activities of the CIA because I think those improper activities interfere with the kind of relationship which

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Admiral Turner talked about this morning and which I think is in fact desirable.

Now I'd like to focus my comments on one issue: Namely, the issue of the role of academics, the American communities, and American universities in secret recruitment of Americans and foreigners for the CIA. As Admiral Turner well knows, that was the main problem which the Church Committee had in mind when it talked about its concern about curbing CIA activities on campus. He well knows that that is in fact the issue of great controversy between critics of the CIA's role on university campuses in the activities of the CIA. And I regret very much that in his statement he has continued the CIA policy of refusing to talk about that role. The role which is explained in the Church Committee report, and a role which is of course, familiar to every foreign intelligence service which is interested in activities in the United States. It is a role, in short, of the CIA which is not familiar to the American public; and I think the CIA has an obligation to discuss that role and to try to justify it rather than to refuse to debate or to discuss it publicly. I think of one speech which briefly ended by putting some questions to Admiral Turner in the hopes it will encourage him to end this silence about these activities to begin to discuss them with us.

The Church Committee, in its report, said it was disturbed by the current practice of operationally using academics and that the restraints on the activities of the CIA on university campuses were to put it "primarily those of sensitivity to the risks

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appreciation of the dangers to the integrity of individuals in institutions, "by those current activities." And the Committee went on to say that it believes it is the responsibility of the university--the universities themselves--to correct this problem. It went on to say, somewhat ironically, that this report on the nature and extent of covert individual relations with the CIA is intended to alert these institutions that there is a problem. Now unfortunately, that was written at the time that the report contained a description, an accurate description, of what the CIA was now doing on the university campuses. But the Church Committee then submitted the report to the CIA. And the CIA, as the Committee told us, insisted that the report be substantially abridged and that the description of the CIA's role in secret recruitment on university campuses be cut down. It was cut down to the point that three members of that committee felt obliged in the concurring remarks to comment on that issue. One of those gentlemen has gone on to be the Vice President of the United States. And what he said to two of his colleagues was that the discovering of the role of the U.S. academics in the CIA clandestine activities has been so diluted in the Church Report that its scope and impact on American academic institutions is no longer clear. So we have to consider what the Church Committee said on the one hand was a great danger and on the other hand that the universities themselves should do something about it. But then they produce a report which Senator Mondale tells us is so

diluted that academics cannot know what in fact, is going on on the campuses that the Church Committee said that they should be concerned about.

The Harvard Report in fact, discusses that problem. And yet in commenting here and elsewhere on the Harvard Report, Admiral Turner to my knowledge has never said anything about these two paragraphs. And I think we'll want to read them in the hopes that that will stimulate some discussion. Talking about CIA recruitment on campus, the Harvard Report says this: the method involves the use of individuals--who may be professors, administrators, or possibly students--and who have an ongoing confidential relationship with the CIA and recruiters. The job of these covert recruiters is to identify to the CIA members of the community, including foreign students, who may be likely candidates for employment or other relationships with the CIA on a regular or sporadic basis. They go on to say that they understand when a recruiter identifies a person he gives the name to the CIA and that the CIA then conducts a background investigation on the individual. But then neither the recruiter nor the CIA informs the individual at this stage that he or she is being considered for employment or other purposes. The Harvard Report goes on to say that it feels for a number of reasons, that I think would be obvious to this audience, such relationships are improper and should not continue. The Harvard Report then recommends that any person who is in this kind of relationship with CIA not identify him or herself publicly as a recruiter

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for the CIA. It goes on to say that no member of the Harvard community should give the name of an individual to the CIA without that individual's permission.

Now, you have been told that this legislation has been introduced in the Senate Intelligence Committee. That legislation authorizes the CIA to continue to operate secret recruiters on universities campuses. It authorizes the CIA to conduct secret background investigations of Americans and foreigners within the United States. Therefore, it seems to me that the academic community has an obligation to take a position, as the Harvard community has done, on whether it thinks this kind of secret recruitment is proper. And if it does not think so, it has an obligation to go before the Senate Intelligence Committee which will be holding hearings on this issue and to say what rules and regulations and what guidelines you'll permit. Now let me conclude simply by putting a few questions to Admiral Turner. First, I'd like to ask whether it's allowed, as the Church Committee reports says, primary recruitment and CIA activities on the university campuses--is the risk of disclosure an embarrassment, rather than a threat to academic freedom? Second, I would like to ask him whether the activities which were described in the Church Committee report which have been quoted to you about activities on a hundred campuses as has been delicately put, maybe introductions have provided leads. Whether that is in fact, still going on on something like a hundred university campuses? Third, I would like to ask him

whether he has considered making public, in view of this administration's commitment to greater openness, making public now those secret portions of the Church report so that, as Senator Mondale told us, we would be able to have publicly an accurate picture of what is now going on on campuses. Mr. Mondale, when he was a senator thought that that could and should be made public. I don't know whether Admiral Turner and others of the Administration have considered whether that can now be done. Fourth, I would like to ask him whether the Harvard Report's description is essentially correct, and insofar as it is or is not correct why it is that the CIA cannot discuss publicly, why it is that he does not discuss publicly, whether that kind of activity goes on without naming names or naming campuses; but just discussing in general terms whether that activity occurs. Finally, I would like to ask whether the CIA is observing the Harvard guidelines that are in effect, those guidelines of Syracuse and other universities; and I would like to ask whether if other universities adopt these rules, the CIA will observe them. And specifically I would like to ask whether the CIA has told its secret recruiters the same thing that it has told the people that it has research relationships with. Namely, that the CIA will reexamine the secrecy obligations that they have taken and permit those people to state publicly that they have been and are now recruiters for the CIA. I think the question of secret recruitment does, as the Church Committee implies, pose very serious problems for academic freedom: And I think the time is long past for the CIA to simply refuse to discuss a subject

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which puts important cases for academic freedom in the
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American Association of University Professors - 10 June 1978

Second Speaker - Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence

Good morning, good afternoon. In thinking about being with you here today, I was struck by the commonality of our profession. The intelligence profession, the academic profession are both founded on good research and searching out information. They're both founded on analyzing that information, interpreting it, adding to the fund of knowledge available. They're both founded on publishing that data, making it available to those who need it so they can draw better conclusions in whatever line of work they are engaged. In our country there is a similarity because in the non-governmental sector there's a greater concentration of research skills as identified by a PhD in the academic community than anywhere else; in the governmental sector that concentration is in the intelligence community. We have more PhD's than anyone else in the government. This commonality means in my view that we have a good enough foundation for a more comfortable, a more mutually supportive relationship than has existed in recent years. I happen to believe that a more mutually supportive relationship between us is particularly important to the United States of America today. Why? Because good intelligence is more important today than at any time since World War II. Your contribution to it can be significant and entirely proper.

Why is it more important that we have good intelligence? Thirty years ago we had absolute military superiority. Today we are in the position of mere parity. Clearly, the leverage of knowing other people's capability and intentions in the military sphere is much greater when you are at a position of mere parity. Thirty years ago we were totally

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independent economically. Today we are clearly interdependent with many other countries. It is much more important today that we know what is going on and what is going to happen in the economic sphere than it was thirty years ago. Thirty years ago we were a dominant political power and many smaller nations took their cue from us automatically. Today not only do those nations not take cues from anybody, but there are many many more of them. Pick up your morning papers and read about a country you never heard of a decade ago. It's everyday in that way. Why, though, must we obtain information about the military, political and economic activities through intelligence? For the simple reasons that we are blessed by living in the most open society the world has ever known. But most of the nations of the world do not enjoy that privilege. And yet the activities of those closed societies have tremendous import and impact on our military, political and economic well being.

For instance, would anyone in this room even think of concluding an agreement on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union if we could not assure you from the intelligence side that we could check and verify whether that agreement is being carried out. This isn't a question of whether you trust the Soviets; whether you have confidence that they will do what they say. The stakes are too high in this particular game for any country to put its total fate in the hands of someone else without any ability to check on them.

So, too, with the many other negotiations in which our government is engaged today in an attempt to reduce the threshold of the

probability of resort to arms. Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe; antisatellite negotiations; comprehensive test bans on nuclear weapons testing; reductions in conventional arms sales around the world - all of these are founded on good intelligence.

But much more than the military sphere is at stake. Our country stands for increased international economic growth, narrowing the gap between the under-privileged nations of the southern hemisphere and those of us to the North. And yet, here too, you need good economic information. You need not be surprised by a closed society like the Soviet Union that entered the grain market in 1973 in a way that disturbs all of our economies and yours and my pocketbook.

The CIA today publishes unclassified estimates. One last summer on the future of the Soviet economy, trying to inform everyone what to expect from that closed society, saying that they are going to have some problems in the decade ahead. Problems which will lead to pressure that will keep them from entering the international market as much as they are today we believe, and therefore impact on American business. We've had a study that was published on the international energy situation - that said that over the next decade the demand for oil out of the ground will be greater than the amount we can physically get out; not that it's not down there, but than we can get out. Therefore, there are bound to be increased pressures on prices and there will be restriction on economic growth. If we are going to combat, as we would like to in this country, a war on international terrorism, you simply have to penetrate and find out what is going on in international terrorist organizations. We do that from an intelligence base. If we are going

to conduct the war on international drug trafficking, you have to do much the same kinds of things.

And in the international political sphere, if you're an interventionist, an activist, you want the United States to get involved, or if you're a pacifist and you don't want the United States to get involved, you simply have to have good information as a foundation for your policy in one direction or the other.

Hence, this country must have today, some organization, call it the CIA or whatever you will, that can operate overseas, openly and clandestinely in order to gain the information that our policymakers need.

Today, however, the rules and the players have changed. Your intelligence community is under the tightest control and is operating more openly than ever before. We are, in my opinion, in an exciting period, an exciting experiment, in which we are evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence. What are these controls? What are these checks and balances that Bill referred to that we now have and did not have when the Church Committee report was written?

One, you have myself, the Director of Central Intelligence, with strengthened authority today. New authority to bring together all of the intelligence activities of our country, not just those of the CIA. And my personal conviction that the Intelligence Community will and must operate in conformance with the laws of this country and with its moral standards; and that it must cooperate fully with the oversight bodies that have been established.

What are those oversight bodies? What are those checks and balances

built into the governmental structure? First is the President and the Vice President who today take a very active and strong interest in our intelligence activities and supervise them closely.

Secondly, there is something known as the Intelligence Oversight Board; three distinguished citizens appointed by the President reporting only to him and to whom you or any of our employees can communicate directly. Call them up, write them and say you think Admiral Turner's off on a bad tack. They will investigate it; report only to the President.

Beyond that there is a new role in the Justice Department; new regulations which they write and tell me how I may go about conducting my business.

And finally, there are two very rigorous oversight committees of the Congress; one in each chamber. And I can tell you having been on the hill for over twelve hours this last week that they hold me to the task. They interrogate me, we provide them detailed information and they know what is going on. In addition to this, I rely very much on the American public as a form of control on our intelligence activities. So today we are responding more to the media; we are coming more to academic conferences and symposiums, writing papers and supporting your activities. We are lecturing more; we are participating more in panels like this - and we are publishing more; we're publishing all that we can legally declassify and still find that we have a value to the American public. And any university or college that is not subscribing to the Library of Congress for \$255 a year to all the publications that we put out from the CIA, and average of two a week on an unclassified

basis, is missing one of the greatest source bargains in the world. We have the Freedom of Information Act and a greater declassification program. These are not just a public relations gimmick, these are founded in a sincere conviction that the better informed the American public is on issues of national interest, the stronger our democracy will be.

We want particularly, however, to share with the academic community. On the one hand because we need you. We need, as any research organization does, outside scrutiny to ask, are we seeing the woods for the trees? Are we making those same old assumptions year after year? Are we mired in our own thinking? Is our analysis rigorous? On the other hand, I think there is an untapped potential for the academic community from the world of intelligence. Our new sophisticated technical means of collecting intelligence has all kinds of potential for you as well as for us. I just learned the other day, for instance, that there's tremendous potential for archeology in our aerial photography capability; an ability to get to archeological ruins that are politically or geographically inaccessible and even to find more when you're there than you can get on the ground. We're anxious to share if we can in spheres like this. At the same time we're anxious to have you share with us your expertise, your knowledge, because we have a basic principle. We do not want to risk and spend money to go out overseas and clandestinely collect information when it is openly available inside our own society. So whatever connections with you, and not only with you but the entire American public, is an informal connection to try to ask questions and find out what people have learned if they have traveled abroad as they have studied or they've done research. And this includes informal consulting in areas of academic and scientific, technical expertise.

Beyond them we do have formal, contractual paid relationships with consultants, or for providing information. These are normally open unless the recipient, the person with whom we contract wants them to be kept confidential. We want the universities, in the cases of academics, to be informed. But clearly the relationship between the individual professor and the university is the relationship between them and not between us and the universities.

We agree that if a university like Bill's requires that all outside commitments of academic members be reported to the administration the CIA should be no exception. We disagree, however; that the CIA relationship should be singled out uniquely as it is in the Harvard guidelines which assumes that only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity. With all the opportunities today for conflict of interest we think that is a naive assumption.

Beyond the exchange of information in both directions, it should be obvious that we in the intelligence community are just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community itself on recruiting good U.S. students, graduates of our universities and our colleges. We can't exist over time without an annual input of a relatively few of the high quality of American university graduates. We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies. I am sorry to have to tell you that there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free associations.

In addition, the CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country, some very few of the 120,000 of these students. And despite malicious stories otherwise, let me assure you that all such

contracts are without coercion, are entirely free, and entirely a matter of choice with individual foreign students.

Let me sum up by saying that in intelligence in our country today we operate under two imperatives. The first is to recognize that the juxtaposition of open and closed societies in our world has dangers for the open society. Now there is not one of us here who would trade the short term advantages that accrue to a closed society for the blessings of openness and respect for the individual human being that we have in our society and we all have faith that that is a long term strength of great advantage. But at the same time we cannot be so naive as to think that we can forego collecting information about these closed societies without giving them undue and unnecessary advantage.

Our second imperative is to recognize that the basic purpose of intelligence in our country is to support and defend its free institutions. We attempt to do that by providing the most comprehensive, the most reliable data we can to the President, to the Congress, to some extent to the American public so that the best decisions for all of us can be made. In my view, it would make no sense whatsoever for us to jeopardize any of those free institutions in the process of collecting that information. I assure you that we are dedicated to conducting intelligence in the United States in ways that will only strengthen the basic institutions, the basic standards of our country. Thank you.

American Association of University Professors - 10 June 1978

In response to Bill Ward's very thoughtful comments on the threat of the CIA to our society: He said first it was a threat because there were not adequate organizational checks and balances. I hope I answered that in my comments. Let me point out that the Church Committee report is outdated by a great deal of the actions that we have taken to carry out these recommendations. Secondly, he was concerned that there can't be constituent power brought to bear as a check on the CIA because we can't tell the public everything about what we do. I agree with him that that is in fact the case. But at the same time, I am listening for a prescription of how to cure that. Our prescription is what I call surrogate public constituent oversight. That surrogate process are these committees of the Congress and the Intelligence Oversight Board that I referred to. As Bill has said, he supports the need for good intelligence in our country. But there is a conflict between having good intelligence and having 100% openness. And it is not the Intelligence Community alone that has secrets in our country. It is the academic community. CAP researchers certainly don't share their research before they publish it. It is the business community, who don't share information on their accounts and their plans and their programs. It is academics who consult with the business community and don't reveal the strategy for the firms that they are advising. All

of us have this problem of where we draw the line between complete public inspection of our activities and some degree of secrecy. We have been drawing it further and further in this country and, under this new model of intelligence, forced public disclosure. We are trying our best, but there are great risks and there have been disclosures that have not been intended that have seriously jeopardized our ability to continue an intelligence function and institution.

Morton asked some questions here that are complex. I'm not sure I've got them all written down or I can decide how to answer them. I think he makes an inference that I want to establish principles. The CIA does not operate collecting intelligence in the United States of America. Our job is to collect foreign intelligence overseas. We don't clandestinely work against the American citizen, or against the foreign citizen in this country. We come to them openly to ask them for information. We're not allowed by law to so call "spy" on the American citizen, or on the foreign citizen in this country. He pointed out that he thinks it's wrong that there be recruiting in which the individual is not informed that he is being considered for a position in the CIA. Everyone of you, every year I suspect, get a number of letters asking who's a good graduate student to go work here, or who would be good professors for the head of a department in another university, or that IBM would like to employ this person or that--could you recommend somebody. And I am sure that if you sum up their

qualities, their strengths, you rush right out and give that to the individual who is concerned. We recruit on campuses, we recruit just like everybody else does. Some of it's open, some of it's not. The not portions--Morton didn't hear me talk about them in my speech; and which he complained vigorously that I did not address or the CIA will not address. For the first time in public I addressed this issue today of recruiting foreign students on campuses and I told you we do very few out of some 120,000 who are here. And there is utterly no coercion in it. And it's no more secretive than much of the other recruiting that is done.

Questions and Answers - 10 June 1978

Q: If we agree that the best intelligence, the best analysis, is necessary for comment on foreign affairs or the whole variety of things which you named; Would it not be possible to split the operational side of the agency completely from the policy and analysis side so that the policy and analysis side would not only be publicly available but I think would even serve the interest of the agency. Secondly, I think that they would have the confidence that they would have a policy analysis for getting a particular spy to contract who is exposed to the scrutiny of other professionals in the field. I think that split between the operational and the policy and analysis side would not only allow academics to participate comfortably, it would also serve the interest of the agency.

A: I think what you're really saying, Bill, is that academics simply have a built in bias--that if they associate with the CIA they're tarnished. Even Norman Bimbaum is associating with us these days. Seriously, the connection between the analysts and the people who collect intelligence--whether they collect it from our technical system, whether they collect it from our human intelligence system, whether they collect it from our overt, open system--is absolutely fundamental to the process of intelligence. It would be like somebody doing research on geological strata out in the field and digging cores and not being willing to talk to the people back in the university who are analyzing it and writing the dissertation. What happens in this game is that the analyst needs some information. He walks across the hall and talks to the man who goes out and collects it. He describes it and the man says well, I've got this system and that system and I'll try a little of each and see what I get. He comes back and says here's what I have and the analyst oh no, you missed the point a little bit over here. I want to know the color of the nodes, not how thick they are. They go back and they try it again. Otherwise, we collect information about Country X and we analyze it on Country Y. It is utterly essential. I have in my time moved within the organization, somewhat in directions other than indicated. I am making a very clear division here, but I can't just separate them and even if I did, what difference would it make. I'd call one the CIA and the other one XIA or something like that and they'd still have to be there and work together. I think it's a subterfuge to simply tell you all that you are not working for the CIA because I call it the XIA.

Q: There is a second issue which is the compatability between operations by intelligence agencies and analysis. It seems to me very different that I would ask Admiral Turner to put a contemporary version on that--whether he does not think it would be an incompatibility. Let's say the President of the United States was to simultaneously order him: one, to produce the best possible analysis of the Cuban role in Africa and two, conduct a worldwide propaganda campaign using CIA assets to exaggerate and to alarm people about the Cuban role in Africa; and whether an academic should not wonder about whether he should cooperate with CIA on the first question if they are simultaneously engaged in the second activity.

A: Let me make sure we are understanding our terms here because that's a very good question. He called covert action the influencing of events in a foreign country. It is not really an intelligence function. Clandestine collection is collecting information secretly overseas about foreign activities. The third function we do is research. They're all lumped together because the country decided some years ago that when it was going to do covert action--attempt to influence events overseas, which is simply one step further in the diplomatic process but not going as far as sending in the marines--it decided that the Central Intelligence Agency would be the one to do that. There have been many studious proposals to separate all covert action activities out of the Central Intelligence Agency and put them elsewhere. When I first arrived I thought that might have some real merit and I looked at it quite carefully. It has some inferences that you want to be careful about. So we do a covert action overseas, like the propaganda situation Morton described, and we concentrate on getting the truth out to other people. We're not out to do a dirty tricks game, we're trying to penetrate and get people to understand what's happening in the world when their media or society is closed. Now, the same people who will do that for us are marvelous sources of intelligence. What would we do if we separate the two. We would construct two bureaucracies--many of them working with the same individuals overseas. It would number one be confusing and difficult, but think of the effect of having a second bureaucracy just for covert action. Ladies and gentlemen you know as well as I that bureaucracies tends to perpetuate themselves and tend to grow. Today if you're in covert action in the CIA, tomorrow it may be an entirely separate section. You don't have to push covert action in order to be sure you have a job tomorrow or that you'll be active and fully employed.

If you have an agency just to do covert action, I'm afraid it will be forced upon us and that it will be generated by that agency, whereas today that is not the case whatsoever. We in the Central Intelligence Agency look on this as a subsidiary function and we only respond to requests for assistance in the covert action field."

Q: Admiral Turner, could you possibly answer one of Morton Halperin's questions about the Church Committee Report and the possible declassification of the censored parts?

A: I'd be happy to. I have not seen nor have access to the portions of the Church Committee Report that were not published. That's a matter of the United States Senate and its committees. I can only assure you that the senators who reviewed what the CIA recommended be published was not published, are by no means tools of the CIA, they made up their minds what was in the national interest to publish, and what was not in the national interest to publish. And if anybody is going to reverse their decision it will be the senators, not the CIA.

Q: My name is Norman Birnbaum, and I was just embraced by Admiral Turner. I would, with respect, distance myself a little bit. As some of you may know, I'm in litigation with the CIA in a mail opening case. This happened under the administration when directorship of the CIA was not an Amherst but a Williams graduate, Richard Helms. The point is this: The nearness to the CIA, on which Admiral Turner spoke on my part, is represented by a consulting appointment to the National Security Council of the Executive Office of the President. It's quite true that in this function as consultant presumably the reports I do could be read by the CIA, they could also xerox my articles and send them around. But the fact is that this relationship is an open relationship which my students and colleagues know about and I must say that I am pleased to be helping the administration in foreign policy--it needs help. I must say that if I had been asked to be a consultant to the CIA, I would refuse. And I would refuse not out of any disinclination to do a public service but because of--and I'm candid at this point--the CIA's record in covert operations and manipulations. It's really very, very difficult if not impossible for anybody interested in contemporary politics or social affairs to approach another colleague and say, look I'm working for the CIA but I'm only asking for local information. It makes it very, very difficult and this is the reason I think that the question raised by the Church Committee and also by Mort Halperin about the separation of covert operations from intelligence, is a question which is in the national interest and would it seems to me be of interest to all of us.

A: Let me start by reaffirming my written apology on behalf of my predecessor to Professor Birnbaum for his mail having been opened. There isn't one of us in the Agency today who doesn't believe that was a reprehensible mistake and we're very apologetic. At the same time, the professor's remark in attempting to distance himself from the CIA while he is working on the NSC, of which the CIA is a component part, strikes me as surprising. Although his relationship with the NSC is open, let me assure you he cannot work there without having access to secret information which he will not share with any of the rest of you or we will have to terminate his employment.

Q: Admiral Turner, I'm addressing a concern to you in your capacity not simply as the Director of the CIA but as head of the Intelligence Community, a position you alluded to yourself. You spoke of research and research is very dear to our hearts. So is science and I think it has to be made clear that research is even steven with science, but not quite the same thing. I'll try to make clear what I mean in a moment. That difference was very pointedly illustrated in several recent occurrences which involved attempts to preempt publication of the results of scientific research. One case I know of was supported by the National Science Foundation. Now the essence of science is not simply research, it is the availability of results to the scientific community and it seems to me that attempts to suppress this result, particularly when the Intelligence Community is not involved at all in financing or funding of these things, is to put it mildly insidious to the health of the scientific community and the academic community. And I don't understand how it could possibly be justified by anyone in the Intelligence Community.

A: To begin with, I looked into this and I know of no authorized intelligence community effort to suppress those pieces of information. It was apparently somebody from the Intelligence Community acting as a member of the association or something who did try to discourage that. At the same time, I hope you are not stating that the man who worked so diligently during the 1940s under Stack Stadium at the University of Chicago should not have been allowed to keep their scientific research secretive. We're only allowed to have secrecy in times during war, is that correct? The distinction between peace and war is not that clear cut. And you certainly don't wait until the day the war starts to start building tanks. Our objective today is to ensure that we don't get into war and we have to have both scientific development and good intelligence information in order to achieve that objective which is what drives all of us in government and international relations.

- Q: I have been personally aware of Stan Turner's career for a good many years and I was pleased with his appointment and wish to assure him I would have voted for the President had I known his intention to assign Stan to his present duty. (inaudible)...Do you feel that we do in fact have a balance of national intelligence effort to make proper use of that.
- A: Thank you Dave. I do. As far as the reduction of clandestine intelligence operators is concerned, I would like to make it very clear that we did not reduce our clandestine people overseas where they are working on the important things. What we did was cut the overhead at headquarters. We were overstaffed and people were underemployed, and I don't see how I can challenge promising young people to make the future intelligence community unless we really challenge them and they were being so challenged because of the excess number of people. The second part of your question was are we working with the academic community, and the answer is no to that. That is what I am striving to improve and I think it is most important to both of us. About once every six weeks I get out on a college campus and speak and talk with students, both in small groups and also big public audiences. I'm trying to open up these channels of communication again because I think there is so much benefit to both sides.
- Q: Admiral Turner, for the sake of this question let's grant that proposition that it is essential from your perspective that the Intelligence Community and academia work together. It is a two part question: What is the professional identity status of the person who is recruited by the CIA as to the CIA's corps of professional and moral integrity? How is this relationship resolved where the contract with the person's university has a disclosure stipulation in other types of employment?
- A: That is a very interesting and good question. We believe with great sincerity that we are as moral and have as much integrity at the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community in general as any profession. The moral conflicts that are generated in intelligence work are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different than the moral conflicts that are faced by most other professions and lines of work in our country. I come to this job as a former military officer. Look at the moral conflicts a military man faces when he asks the question--will he shoot to kill. There is no greater moral conflict that a man must face in life. Look at the moral conflicts that have been exposed in recent years about the American business community. Will you lose that contract or will you offer a bribe to that foreign company, or country with whom you are dealing. So

too, we in the intelligence have moral conflicts. But they are not different. They are tough and we work hard to get our people to understand basic ground rules under which they work, the standards which the President of the United States will accept, that I will accept, and it is not easy and it puts a tremendous load on the young people who come in and accept the sacrifices of being in the intelligence business. I assure you there are real sacrifices, but we do have a great sense of integrity and moral standards. I intend to insure that those are rigorously enunciated to all, the people who join our organization. And I would like you to know that at this moment I am very engrossed in a project with the leading academics and the leading universities in writing a specific code of ethics for the intelligence community. I found when I took this job that this man had written an article in a leading journal he said there was a code of ethics needed in the intelligence community. I called him up and asked him if he would work. That was a year and a quarter ago, we are still working on it. You can laugh, but it is not easy to do. It is not easy to write something that will be specific enough to give guidance and not so specific as to tie people's hands. Yet, I owe it to my people to give them moral and ethical guidance, because the man in the field has got to take that responsibility on his shoulders. They're young men and women out there who are doing it for you. They are brave, they are capable and they are moral. I am trying hard to give them explicit guidance to help them on their course. I thank you for the privilege of being with you today. I look forward to more interchange between all of us in the intelligence community of our country and all of you in the academic professions we all hold in such high esteem.

7.
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"The C.I.A. and the Academic Community"

One may take two perspectives on the Central Intelligence Agency: the first from the perspective of a citizen, the second from the perspective of a member of the academic community. The two perspectives converge, however, on a single important question: how to maintain conditions which support a free and open society?

We live in a culture used to verbal excess. The argument why the C.I.A. raises questions about the conditions of freedom in modern American society rests, however, on two assertions which may sound excessive, but which I mean seriously, however quietly I prefer to give voice to them.

First, the C.I.A. is a threat to the traditional meaning of the Constitution of the United States;

Second, the C.I.A. is a threat to the integrity of the academic community, and the integrity of the academic community is important to the social conditions of freedom in a democratic society.

1. The Founding Fathers had a deep skepticism about human nature and its weakness against the temptations of power. A proper constitution should, they thought, provide security against arbitrary power. To compress a long and complicated historical argument, one may say there have been from the beginning in American political thought two views how power may be made responsible.

The first view places emphasis on the form of government created by a constitution, on the institutional arrangement of the departments of government. Responsible government is to be achieved by setting up a government in which power is distributed carefully among the various parts in order to check undue power by any one particular branch in the whole, finely articulated, self-regulating system. In this view, checks against arbitrary or irresponsible power

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-2-

are institutionalized within the government which the constitution creates. A good constitution is judged by the form of government it creates. In the American experience, this is the view one normally associates with the term, "checks and balances."

The second view of the constitution puts emphasis not so much on the organization of the departments of government created by the constitution but on the ^{act of} constituting government itself, the process by which governments are made or unmade, and insists that the true check on the power of government, on any one or all of the particular branches of government, lies always in the power of the people outside the doors of government. In this view, the measure of a good constitution is not the form of government which the constitution creates but the effectiveness of the process by which the people out of government are constantly able to discipline government by exercising the inalienable power which ultimately creates and sanctions all governments. In the American experience, it is the view one normally associates with the term, "constituent power."

The C.I.A. threatens to confound either view of the constitution as a check against irresponsible power. On the effectiveness of internal checks and balances (such devices as legislative oversight, the power of the purse, control by enabling legislation), the Senate Select Committee, chaired by Senator Church, concluded: "There has been, in short, a clear and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community and to ensure its accountability. There has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their activities and to comply with directives from those authorities" (Final

-3-

On the effectiveness of the power of constituents outside of government, one may point only to the difficulty of receiving any information which may allow one to discover what one needs to know in order to make an informed judgment on any question. There is the Freedom of Information Act, to be sure, but the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is also mandated by the National Security Act not to disclose information which in the Director's judgment may imperil the confidentiality of sources or the security of the United States. The power of the people outside of government depends upon their capacity to know what goes on inside of government. That is not formally impossible, but it is practically improbable with the C.I.A.

2. The challenge the C.I.A. presents to traditional constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and unchecked power is, for the citizen, more important, more interesting, and more grave because it is a challenge to the general political order of modern American society. Yet, although on a less grand scale, the challenge of the C.I.A. to the integrity of the academic community is also a threat to the general political order because it is a threat to the social conditions of freedom in a democratic society.

Again, the argument, because it is interesting, is long and complex. One must indicate it in summary fashion. It is, essentially, the liberal argument against the power of the state, an argument for the necessity of pluralism to check inordinate power, whether political or social, wherever it appears. Madison and Tocqueville are its chief spokesmen.

The danger, especially in modern, complex, mass societies, is the dichotomy between the state and the single individual citizen. Despite political privilege and legal rights, the lone individual is hardly an equal in any contest

with the state. The pluralistic argument for the social fabric of a free political order assumes the necessity of autonomous institutions, free from control by the state, which provide buffers between the state and the citizen. One thinks of business, the church, the press, unions, foundations, and the university.

Recent history has seen the erosion of the capacity of the ordinary citizen to believe in the integrity and the autonomy of such institutions. We have witnessed the loss of trust in the institutions of American society. The government, not wholly, to be sure, but in considerable measure, bears a considerable share of blame for weakening the conditions of trust which sustain the confidence of individual citizens. When foundations and universities, newspapers and publishers, unions and church organizations begin to be seen as covert extensions of the power of the state, an uneasy skepticism begins to pervade the mass of citizens. Nothing seems impossible; paranoia becomes plausible.

In the name of freedom and security, we have allowed an erosion of the meaning of the Republic and an erosion of the political and social safeguards which protect freedom within it. As one institution, although only one, the academic community has a responsibility, quite beyond its own special values and concerns, to demonstrate to the ordinary citizen that, yes, it is what it seems to be, that it is not an agency of the state, that it is an independent center of thought and teaching and research.

The C.I.A. and the Academic Community

The Report of the "Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities" of the United States Senate, the "Church Committee Report" of 1976, and the report in detail the history of the involvement

of the C.I.A. with academic institutions and individual academics. The conclusion of its hearings was that "there is a problem." The Church Committee believed, however, in the necessary needs of the nation for intelligence and for the "best advice and judgment our universities can produce," and that legislation on the use of individuals in the academic world was both unenforceable and a further intrusion of the state into the affairs of the academy, so it made no recommendations for legislation. Instead, the Committee concluded, it "believes that it is the responsibility of private institutions and particularly the American academic community to set up the professional and ethical standards of its members."

One can only welcome the reticence of the Church Committee in not recommending the intrusion of government into the internal affairs of colleges and universities, especially when a major concern generated by its report is the autonomy of academic institutions. Yet, the Church Committee report, itself censored by the very agencies it was investigating, puts a heavy burden on academic institutions because its Report deals with generalities at some distance from the "problem" it concludes is a real problem. It may be difficult to set one's own house in order when one does not know what disorder prevails, still the academic community has the obligation to think through and to be self-conscious of what its own professional and ethical standards are in relation to involvement with the C.I.A. or other agencies of the government and, even, with other institutions, public or private, which seek its services.

There is an obvious danger in doing so, of course, the danger of arousing apprehensions that there is or has been in a particular college or university some unacceptable relationship with the C.I.A. As the President of one college, I can say I have no knowledge of any relationship with the C.I.A. member

of the faculty, student body, or staff of Amherst College with the C.I.A. As President of the College, under the Freedom of Information Act, I did seek to discover whether any relationship did exist. The Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Bush and later Admiral Turner, responded courteously and reflectively, but declined to answer the question.

There is the further danger of implying that any relationship with the C.I.A. is unacceptable. Surely, that cannot be so. It is of national importance that the government of the United States has the best intelligence possible on foreign affairs. It is obvious that the professional knowledge and scholarly competence of many faculty in American colleges and universities are an immensely valuable resource to an effective system of intelligence. The only caveat, the whole point of formulating standards for appropriate involvement in the gathering of intelligence, is that the relationship between an institution or an individual with the C.I.A., or any other agency or external body, not contradict general standards of professional conduct.

Premise: All members of the academic community have the responsibility
to avoid actions which call into question the integrity of colleges
and universities as independent and autonomous centers of teaching
and research.

The premise, one will quickly recognize is general, and not addressed only and particularly to involvement with the C.I.A., although the injunction of the Church Committee provides the occasion to reflect on criteria for the self-government of academic institutions. To put it another way, whatever standards or guidelines are established should be generalizable. If disclosure is appropriate for a relation with a governmental agency, so it is for a relation with other external bodies. For example, a professor teaching labor law who receives

a fee as consultant with a labor union or corporate employer should let the students he teaches or the colleagues he addresses through word or publication know, so his objectivity may be considered and fairly assessed by those to whom he speaks.

To suggest there is an individual responsibility to the corporate good of the academic community raises a classic problem.

I will put aside the practical problem that if an individual chooses to engage secretly in an action which is contrary to the general norms of the community, there is -- by definition -- no way to know or to take that fact into account. It may be impossible to know whether a member of the academic community is acting in violation of the presumed norms of conduct for one who is a member of the academic community.

At the college of which I am president, there exists a code of intellectual responsibility. It asserts, "Amherst cannot educate those who are unwilling to submit their own work and ideas to critical assessment." That is a statement about intellectual responsibility on the part of students. It is also true for anyone connected with the College who cares about its essential educational purpose. That sentence is an attempt to capture in words the ideal of an intellectual community, namely, the belief that openness, honesty, the willingness to say what one has to say publicly, to accept criticism and to attend to opposing views, that all these qualities are essential, the necessary conditions of intellectual and educational life.

Secrecy subverts these essential values and conditions. Secrecy is, to put it shortly, intolerable in an academic community. The C.I.A., of course, insists that although it will not disclose any relation it has with a particular academic that any individual who does have a relationship with it is surely free to say so publicly.

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In effect, there is no bar to individual disclosure. The AAUP, in a resolution passed at its Annual Meeting, June 1976, in response to the Report of the Church Committee, called "on all academics to participate only in those governmental activities whose sponsorship is fully disclosed." If the government refuses itself to disclose its sponsorship, then the responsibility devolves on the individual to disclose the nature of the relationship to students, professional colleagues, and others who may be affected by it.

To say so is to tread on delicate ground, namely, the freedom of the individual to do what he or she chooses with one's own time and energy, whatever the attitudes of others. Practically, as has already been suggested, there is no way to enforce the claim for openness on the individual who rejects the claim. The ground is more delicate than that, however. The difference may be principled, not just practical. The danger in laying down general or institutional rules for individual conduct is that the individual may, on principle, reject the premises on which the generality builds. Further, given widespread suspicion toward any involvement with the C.I.A. because of its past practices, there may be an understandable anxiety about public awareness of any association with the Agency.

Having said all that, having taken into account the practical, principled, and psychological objections, one may still insist that the nature of the intellectual enterprise requires as much candor as one is humanly capable of achieving. How each single college or university will arrange its affairs to insure the probability that individuals will live up to their professional responsibility is, as I have said, a delicate problem in governance. Local traditions and local mores will determine how that may best be done. But I do think that it is dangerous to imagine that each individual is the only judge because that is to take the very ground on which the C.I.A. defends itself, namely, that anyone connected with it is free to say so. There is a corporate responsibility which transcends the individual faculty.
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what their professional or corporate responsibility is. It is up to the faculty of each institution to determine that, not just their professional responsibility to this or that particular institution, but their responsibility to the profession.

On the institutional side, namely, the responsibility of people like myself who are administrators, the problem seems to me much easier. I do not think that any administration of any college or university should:

1. Accept or administer grants or contracts whose sponsorship is not openly disclosed;
2. Allow sponsored research if the faculty member is not free to publish the results of that research openly;
3. Cooperate with any security clearance or inquiry into the background of any member of the faculty, staff, or student body without the obligation to inform the individual of such action;
4. Allow the recruitment of faculty, students, and staff for any employment by any agency unless the recruitment is public and open.

Finally, one comment to put things in a larger perspective. Situations may arise in which one chooses consciously to violate the standards of professional conduct because of the claim of a greater good. A respected colleague once put the dilemma by way of an anecdote. We know that the war against Nazi Germany was greatly helped by acquiring, in Poland, the cipher machine which was used to code German war orders. If conditions were such that an American professor, ostensibly acting as an independent scholar but in fact a secret agent, were necessary for the securing of the cipher machine, would it be permissible for the professor to do so?

The hard answer has to be that as an academic (as our philosophic friends like to say, qua academic) the action is impermissible because it violates professional standards of openness and honesty. The professor, conscious of the claim

of the ethical standards of his or her professional calling, might well choose to put them aside. One good may have to give way to another.

But the principle of professional responsibility and the openness and honesty it dictates must be asserted and defended, and explicated in some of its particulars, before one may make an adequate judgment when, consciously, to violate it. The public one means finally to serve must be confident that only grave and pressing danger could possibly lead to the surrender of professional obligation. It is the responsibility of all members of American colleges and universities to conduct their professional life to deserve public confidence and to take no action which will call into question the integrity and the autonomy of American academic institutions.

10 June 78

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FBI DAN WALL

FBI ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

NEW HAVEN, CONN. (AP) - CIA Director STANSFIELD TURNER said SATURDAY THAT THE CIA RECRUITS FOREIGNERS STUDYING OR TEACHING IN THE UNITED STATES; BUT WITH NO MORE SECRECY THAN PRIVATE BUSINESS RECRUITING.

TURNER TOLD A MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS THAT THE CIA SEEKS INFORMATION SOURCES "OPENLY" ON ABOUT 150 U.S. CAMPUSES.

RESPONDING TO A QUESTION BY CIA CRITIC MORTON HALPERIN, WHO APPEARED ON THE SAME PANEL, TURNER SAID THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RECRUITS "A FEW OUT OF THE 120,000" FOREIGNERS STUDYING OR TEACHING IN THIS COUNTRY.

"IT IS NO MORE SECRETIVE THAN ANY OF THE OTHER RECRUITING THAT WE DO," HE ADDED.

HE TOLD THE AUDIENCE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED AAUP MEMBERS THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT CIA RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGNERS ON U.S. CAMPUSES.

QUESTIONED BY HALPERIN ABOUT INQUIRIES MADE WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL SOURCES, TURNER SAID THE CIA RECRUITING PROCESS IS NO DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES AND UNIVERSITIES. RECRUITERS OFTEN LOOK FOR THE BEST POSSIBLE EMPLOYEES BEFORE APPROACHING THEM DIRECTLY, HE SAID.

THE CIA NEEDS MORE ASSISTANCE FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY IN GATHERING INFORMATION ABOUT "CLOSED" FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, HE ADDED. HE CRITICIZED THOSE WHO ASSUME FACULTY MEMBERS WILL BE "TARNISHED IF THEY ASSOCIATE WITH THE CIA."

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW FACULTY MEMBERS WORKING FOR THE CIA SHOULD CONDUCT THEMSELVES, TURNER SAID HE HAS BEEN WORKING FOR MORE THAN A YEAR WITH A FACULTY LEADER FROM A "LEADING UNIVERSITY . . . WRITING A SPECIFIC CODE OF ETHICS."

AFTER THE MEETING HE DECLINED TO IDENTIFY THE TEACHER.

AP-NY-06-10 1737EDT

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8 May 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :

SUBJECT : Preparation for Panel at Yale, 10 June 1978

1. Your meeting with Halperin on this panel will be unlike other confrontations you have had at universities in that

- Halperin is an informed critic;
- he is sure to bring up questions for which there are no easy answers (e.g., secret campus recruiting of foreign students);
- the audience will expect real answers and reject waffles (not that others haven't, but the nature of the others permitted some waffling);
- the impression you make on part of the audience (Assoc. of American University Professors) can influence future efforts in the academic relations/guidelines area.

Consequently, I suggest it is worth devoting some time in preparation.

2. I have asked Herb's office to compile a list of Halperin's accusations/complaints against the CIA/IC from his writings and articles about him. They are doing that. Then I recommend at least one 2-hour Q&A and critique of A session around 7-8 June, followed by another on plane enroute.

Very respectfully,

✓cc: Herb Hetu

19 APRIL 1977

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There's More Intelligence In Classrooms Than You Think

Despite last year's Senate Select Committee's report on Intelligence saying there was massive CIA influence in U.S. universities, the Central Intelligence Agency is still in the education business. The CIA is still funding research conducted on many of the nation's campuses, is still recruiting students and professors for extracurricular activities and is still helping foreign spy agencies keep tabs on dissident foreign students.

The full scope of CIA involvement on campuses may never be known. According to the final report of the Committee, scores of professors, administrators and graduate students are actively engaged in "open" and "clandestine" CIA work. They recruit American and foreign students, write propagandistic literature, conduct research and travel abroad using their cloak of academic status for cover.

Specifics of these operations were deleted by the CIA before the Committee released its final report, including the names of whatever individuals and institutions that had been cooperating with the CIA. And due to a Presidential order given last year, the CIA will continue to enter into "contracts and arrangements" for "classified or unclassified research... with academic institutions." It is not yet known whether or not President Carter will continue this policy.

However, an increasing number of students and faculty members throughout the country have become very vocal in their disapproval with the too-cozy relationship between the CIA and colleges. The unsavory flavor associated with a multitude of CIA activities has led several national academic associations to condemn clandestine CIA presence on campus.

Although they have received little national attention, the National Student Association, the American Association of University Professors and the Council of American Political Science Association have passed resolutions opposing any initiation by government agencies to involve academia in covert intelligence operations under the guise of academic research and have asked their members not to participate in such activities.

But for some, that is not enough. Nathan Gardel, a student attending the University of California in Los Angeles, wants to know the full extent of involvement between the CIA and the University system. He has filed for this information through the Freedom of Information Act and is currently trying to have the \$3,000 copying fee waived to get it. Gardel, however, has not stopped there.

He wants to see all correspondence between the CIA and the nine-school university system relating to the CIA recruitment drive of last year and all information about UC contracts. Gardel believes that the UC president, David Saxon, has not been entirely free with the information. Gardel explained "this is not to say he (Saxon) knows everything" but we'd like to see what he does know. At present, the CIA is openly funding weather climate research at UC San Diego. Climate warfare was used by the CIA in Vietnam and Cuba.

More recently, an alleged CIA connection with a college professor of Brooklyn College in New York has stirred controversy to the point where the faculty members of the political science department have asked for their colleague's removal from the staff.

The professor, Michael I. Selzer, has been charged by several faculty members, one of them his brother-in-law, with being associated with the CIA. In a statement to the president of the college, the department members said that because of Selzer's "admitted agreement in covert intelligence activities for the CIA, he has violated... understood, accepted statements (by national associations) and casts grave doubts of his credibility as a teacher, scholar and professional colleague... and that his actions as described warrant removal from the college."

Selzer, according to one professor, first became involved with the CIA last spring. Selzer is quoted as saying "his work for the CIA was only confined to Europe." No other details are known.

Selzer supposedly admitted his CIA connection at a recent departmental meeting. He is now

in Israel on a leave of absence, but when contacted there by several New York newspapers, Selzer denied that he had any contact with the CIA. He also said that he'll take legal action if dismissed and is contemplating libel charges.

A spokesperson for the college said the president, Dr. John Kneller, has already set up a committee to investigate all facts and allegations pertinent to the case and assured all that Selzer's rights would be protected.

In a prepared statement, however, Kneller said, "It is up to an individual faculty member whether he wants to establish an 'open' relation with an intelligence agency. I stress the word 'open' because I think there is no place in the academic community for a clandestine relationship of any kind."

One organization, based in Washington, D.C., is attempting to college and distribute any and all information regarding CIA-campus related activities. The Center for National Security Studies offers information, education material, pamphlets and speakers for those who wish to join in ending covert operations on campus. Write or phone Christy Macy at the Center, 122 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 544-5380.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Mr. Peter L. Danner
Department of Economics
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

Dear Mr. Danner:

This is in response to your letter of 8 November to our Director, informing him of the views about CIA of the members of the Association for Social Economics.


As Mr. Bush stated in his May letter to William Van Alstyne of the American Association of University Professors,

"The Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and scholarly institutions. They include negotiated contracts for scientific research and development, contracts for social science research on the many matters that affect foreign policy, paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, contacts with individuals who have travelled abroad, and other similar contacts that help us provide the policymakers of our government with information and assessments of foreign developments."

We seek conscious and voluntary cooperation from people who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States. We do not seek to embarrass your profession, to interfere with or betray academic freedom, or to obstruct the free search for and exposition of truth. We fully appreciate the benefits of professional scholarship, and freely admit to you that both the CIA and the government would be less able to act wisely in foreign policy if scholars felt that they should isolate themselves from government or government from the fruits of scholarship.

In sum, we think our academic relations are strong and that they must be sustained. Our problem is to be certain that the relationship of scholars to CIA is understood on all sides. I hope that this letter is helpful in that way.

Sincerely,



Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director

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STAT

CIA Agents on U.S. Campuses

Foe Claims Intelligence Officers Are Used Mainly to Recruit

BY WILLIAM TROMBLEY
Times Staff Writer

SANTA BARBARA—A leading critic of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency said Friday that the CIA has "one or two or perhaps several secret agents" on each of more than 100 American campuses.

Morton H. Halperin, a former member of the National Security Council, said his information was based on descriptions he has received of secret portions of the recent report

of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.).

Halperin told the American Assn. of University Professors, meeting at UC Santa Barbara, that the CIA agents are administrators, faculty members and teaching graduate students who "basically are recruiters."

"They try to spot students or faculty members who might be useful" to the CIA by gathering information at international academic conferences

and the like, according to Halperin.

They also "look for other recruiters," he said, "either Americans or foreigners, people who will go back to their countries and be spies for the CIA."

Halperin named no institutions but said, "I assume it's concentrated in universities where there are a large number of foreigners" as students or visiting faculty members.

Campus agents generally are known only to the CIA and to themselves but occasionally their identities are known to one or more college officials, Halperin said.

Some are paid and others work "out of patriotism," he stated.

Once a recruiter spots a potential CIA agent he send the name to the agency, which conducts a security check, according to Halperin.

Halperin also stated, as did the Church committee, that some scholarly research has been secretly funded by the CIA.

The Church committee's report, released in late April, said generally that hundreds of professors, administrators and graduate students, as well as officials of private foundations, have had clandestine ties with the CIA, the FBI and other U.S. intelligence gathering agencies.

However, specific descriptions of these ties were deleted from the final report at the request of the CIA.

Halperin said his speech Friday was the first detailing of just how the CIA works on campuses.

He said his information came from "the secret version of the Church re-

port" but said he had deleted material himself to say where he got it.

"I am confident saying is true but I cannot tell you where I got it," Halperin told reporters after the meeting.

Halperin has devoted considerable time and energy in recent months to attacking the CIA for its undercover ties to journalists, academics and others in American life.

He has filed suit against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and former government officials because, he contends, his telephone was tapped for a 21-month period from 1969 to 1971.

CIA ties with academic figures were defended at Friday's meeting by Gordon D. Baldwin, professor of constitutional law at the University of Wisconsin and former counselor on international law for the State Department.

Baldwin argued that "foreign intelligence gathering is vital to our common good" and said that "in a majority of cases . . . there was no wrong."

He said if the CIA had received more academic input "we might all have profited."

He suggested that there is little difference between a law firm asking a faculty member to recommend a new employee and the CIA asking special campus agents to identify possible recruits.

Halperin replied that scholars should have the right to publish under CIA auspices if they wish but should acknowledge the source of their support.

He also said CIA agents on campus should identify themselves so their students and colleagues would know with whom they are dealing.

And he proposed that names of possible recruits should not be submitted to the CIA without permission of the individuals and that security checks should not be carried out without their approval.

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Executive Registry

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 7, 1976

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Sincerely,

Gordon B. Baldwin

Gordon B. Baldwin
Counselor on International Law

Professor of Law
University of Wisconsin

Enclosures:
As stated.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : 25 June AAUP Annual Meeting and the Offer
of Mr. Baldwin to be Helpful at Same
(Attached)

1. I phoned Mr. Baldwin this morning to say that we do not have a Van Alstyne letter dated 24 May. You will note that Mr. Baldwin will appear on the panel re CIA/FBI. He told me it is alluded to in an AAUP newsletter which he is sending along for Mr. Bush. He went on to say that he wished to be as helpful as possible and would welcome any supporting material or ideas. He also advised that he is a law professor at the University of Wisconsin on loan to the Department and will be returning there in the near future.

2. I expressed appreciation on behalf of Mr. Bush and advised that we would be back in touch with him. Please give me any thoughts you may have for DCI review.

B. C. Evans
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Distribution:

Mr. Walsh
Mr. Lehman

Mr. Thuermer

(for DDO)

Info cc:

Mr. Bush
General Walters
Mr. Knoche
Mr. Lapham (GC)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5 June 1976

Mr. Kenneth Parkhurst, President
Ohio Conference
American Association of University Professors
John Carroll University
4177 Okalona Road
South Euclid, Ohio 44121

Dear President Parkhurst:

Thank you for your letter of 20 May 1976, in which you informed me of the resolution recently adopted by the Ohio Conference of the AAUP. As you undoubtedly are aware, William Van Alstyne, President of the AAUP, wrote to me expressing similar concerns. I believe that my response to him was clear, and I take the liberty of quoting from that letter, dated 11 May. I said,

"The Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and scholarly institutions. They include negotiated contracts for scientific research and development, contracts for social science research on the many matters that affect foreign policy, paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, contacts with individuals who have travelled abroad, and other similar contacts that help us fulfill our primary responsibility; i.e., to provide the policy makers of our government with information and assessments of foreign developments.

We seek the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States. Those who help are expressing a freedom of choice. Occasionally such relationships are confidential at our request, but more often they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not be free to make this particular choice.


None of the relationships are intended to influence either what is taught or any other aspect of a scholar's work. We specifically do not try to inhibit the 'free search for truth and its free exposition.' Indeed, we



would be foolish to do so, for it is the truth we seek. We know that we have no monopoly on fact or on understanding, and to restrict the search for the truth would be extremely detrimental to our own purposes. If CIA were to isolate itself from the good counsel of the best scholars in our country, we would surely become a narrow organization that could give only inferior service to the government. The complexity of international relations today requires that our research be strong, and we intend to keep it strong by seeking the best perspectives from inside and outside the government."

I hope that the above statement is reassuring. Let me say that any employee of any school with whom we have had an exchange of views in his capacity as employee is free to acknowledge that fact publicly or to his college or university administration. My understanding of these matters leads me to believe, however, that while consulting with any part of our government a scholar usually thinks of himself as a private actor rather than as part of the institution of higher education from which he comes. Thus, he feels neither more nor less obligated to report his relationship with CIA than he would his consultations with other U.S. agencies, with U.S. and foreign businesses, or with foreign governments. Since we do not seek scholarly contact from particular schools, but rather reach out for advice from the best authorities wherever they may be, I see some merit in the scholar's logic.

Sincerely,


George Bush
Director

cc: DCI
DDCI
E. H. Knoche
DDS&T
DDI
DEA
DDO
D/DCI/NIO
Asst/DCI
C/IPS
C/Review Staff
OPR/
ES
ER

- 2 -

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Executive Registry

25 MAY 1976

Professor William W. Van Alstyne
American Association of University Professors
One Dupont Circle - Suite 500
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Professor Van Alstyne:

Thank you for your letter of 20 May.

We will await further word from Dr.

Duffey.

Sincerely,

George Bush
George Bush
Director

O/ES/BCE:sfc

Distribution:

O - Addressee

1 - DDO

1 - DDI

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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25X1

11 MAY 1976

Professor William W. Van Alstyne
American Association of University Professors
One Dupont Circle - Suite 500
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Professor Van Alstyne:

I received your letter of May 4, 1976, concerning CIA relations with the academic community on the same day that you released it to the press and gave a press interview about it. The fact that you did not await a response from me before making your letter public is somewhat troubling. Unfortunately, your doing this could suggest to others that your purpose is something other than the resolution of the problem you perceive.

Having said that, I firmly reject your allegations that CIA corrupts American "colleges and universities by making political fronts of them," that they "are made conduits of deceit" and that "faculty members are paid to lie." These charges reflect your ignorance of the true nature of the relationships we now have with American educational institutions and their faculties. To issue a statement that I am taking "steps to end the exploitation of the academic community," as you request, would give credibility to the series of erroneous assumptions and allegations in your letter. Whatever you have heard about the past, I can assure you that there is now no reason for the members of your association to fear any threat to their integrity or their high sense of purpose from CIA.

The Agency has several kinds of relationships with scholars and scholarly institutions. They include negotiated contracts for scientific research and development, contracts for social science research on the many matters that affect foreign policy, paid and unpaid consultations between scholars and CIA research analysts, contacts with individuals who have travelled abroad, and other similar contacts that help us fulfill our primary responsibility; i.e., to provide the policy makers of our government with information and assessments of foreign developments.



We seek the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States. Those who help are expressing a freedom of choice. Occasionally such relationships are confidential at our request, but more often they are discreet at the scholar's request because of his concern that he will be badgered by those who feel he should not be free to make this particular choice.

None of the relationships are intended to influence either what is taught or any other aspect of a scholar's work. We specifically do not try to inhibit the "free search for truth and its free exposition." Indeed, we would be foolish to do so, for it is the truth we seek. We know that we have no monopoly on fact or on understanding, and to restrict the search for the truth would be extremely detrimental to our own purposes. If CIA were to isolate itself from the good counsel of the best scholars in our country, we would surely become a narrow organization that could give only inferior service to the government. The complexity of international relations today requires that our research be strong, and we intend to keep it strong by seeking the best perspectives from inside and outside the government.

Your letter indicates a serious lack of confidence in people in your own profession--a view that I do not share; that is, your belief that your academic colleagues, including members of your association, would accept pay "to lie about the sources of their support, to mislead others, to induce betrayed confidences, to misstate the true objects of their interest, and to misrepresent the actual objectives of their work." It is precisely that kind of irresponsible charge that tends to drive responsible relationships away from openness and toward the secretiveness that you seem to abhor.

Finally, Professor Van Alstyne, the seriousness of your charges demands that we find a way toward better understanding. Because we owe that to both our organizations, I invite you to meet with a few senior officials of this Agency for that purpose.

Sincerely,

/s/ George Bush
George Bush
Director

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WASHINGTON POST

6 MAY 1976

25X1

Professors Decry Recruiting by CIA

By Noel Epstein

Washington Post Staff Writer

A leading organization of college and university professors urged the Central Intelligence Agency yesterday to stop recruiting academics for covert activities that "betray their professional trust."

The step by the American Association of University Professors reflects its distress over Senate intelligence committee disclosures that "several hundred" academics are engaged in clandestine CIA work.

In a letter to CIA Director George Bush, William W. Van Alstyne, president of the 75,000-member group, said, "A government which corrupts its colleges and universities by making political fronts of them has betrayed academic freedom and compromised all who teach."

In an interview, Van Alstyne, who is a Duke University law professor, acknowledged that the blame also lies with academics who agree to become clandestine CIA operatives.

"The CIA is the briber and the academic is the bribe—we're asking the briber to cut it out," he said, adding that he soon may admonish the campus community in the association's newspaper.

He also said that if "an institution can show us that a person is guilty of such a serious abuse of professional standards, then we think the institution is right" if it fires the professor. The AAUP is a union as well as a professional association.

The Senate committee did not make public the names of the academics involved in covert CIA activities.

Van Alstyne made clear

that the AAUP is not objecting to all CIA involvement with professors, only that which it believes compromises academic integrity.

This area might include cases, he said, in which professors knowingly do research under CIA sponsorship but fail to disclose this funding; misrepresent sheer propaganda efforts as scholarship or abuse students' and colleagues' confidences by passing them on to the intelligence agency.

The association is not necessarily opposed to instances where "faculty members return from foreign conferences and someone in the CIA asks them what they saw or did," Van Alstyne remarked. "That is not covert and not necessarily improper."

According to the Senate committee, most of the CIA's "many thousands" of academic contacts have been of this nature, and the panel did not view these as imperiling academic integrity.

In his letter to Bush, Van Alstyne noted that the CIA director has agreed to stop employing missionaries and "accredited" journalists for covert operations and urged the same treatment for professors.

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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
ONE DUPONT CIRCLE . SUITE 500
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
Telephone 202-466-8050

Executive Sec
76-72

25X1
25X1

President
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE
Duke University
General Secretary
JOSEPH DUFFEY
Washington Office

Mr. George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

The recent report of the Senate Select Committee on Foreign and Military Intelligence has confirmed what was already published elsewhere: that the CIA has for years covertly used academic institutions and employed academic persons in ways which compromise institutional and professional integrity. Universities and scholars have been paid to lie about the sources of their support, to mislead others, to induce betrayed confidences, to misstate the true objects of their interest, and to misrepresent the actual objectives of their work.

In ending the practice of CIA employment of missionaries and journalists for covert operations, you have demonstrated your concern for and your willingness to protect the integrity and independence of those institutions. As national President of the American Association of University Professors, I call upon you now to provide the same guarantees against misuse and subversion for our colleges and universities so that they may be freed of the stigma of covert, and often unknowing, participation in manipulative government operations conducted by the CIA.

The American Association of University Professors espouses the professional freedom of teachers and scholars not as some peculiar entitlement of their own but as a duty that they owe to their students and to the community as a whole. For this reason, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, issued jointly by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges and endorsed by approximately a hundred learned and professional associations, provides:

"Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.

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A government which corrupts its colleges and universities by making political fronts of them has betrayed academic freedom and compromised all who teach. When colleges and universities are made conduits of deceit and when faculty members are paid to lie, there is an end to the common good of higher education.

On behalf of the American Association of University Professors, I write to express my dismay and utter repugnance at the disregard for the integrity of institutions of higher education shown by the CIA. The practice of shamelessly exploiting the reputation of American academics for trustworthiness, which has characterized CIA activity in the past, evidently continues today. I see no reason whatsoever why higher education should not be treated with the same regard previously shown in your action ending the covert use of missionaries and journalists by the CIA. I ask you to take steps to end the exploitation of the academic community and to disengage the Agency from covert activities which induce academics to betray their professional trust.

The American academic community awaits the necessary forthright CIA guarantees that its integrity will not be further compromised.

Sincerely,

William Van Alstyne

William W. Van Alstyne

WVA:mjw

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ER

Public Apathy on CIA Abuses Criticized

Reform May Be Doomed by Complacency, Senators Fear

BY JACK NELSON

Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—The head of a university professors' association worries about the academic community's indifferent reaction to the Senate Intelligence Committee's finding that the CIA continues to have covert relationships with hundreds of academics at more than 100 American universities and institutions.

A member of the Intelligence Committee wonders whether the public can be convinced that the lawlessness of the FBI and the CIA that is documented by the committee in two voluminous reports actually occurred.

Two other senators say that the lessons of Watergate and other disclosures of domestic political spying have been forgotten—or never learned—and that no significant re-

forms have been adopted.

All of this raises the question of whether America has become so inured to disclosures of government wrongdoing that public opinion—a vital element necessary for reform in a democracy—is paralyzed.

Despite the Intelligence Committee's recent report disclosing a 40-year pattern of political spying and deceptive practices by the FBI, with the knowledge and sometimes the encouragement of Presidents and attorneys general, there has been little public reaction.

This apathy has led some committee members to wonder whether the recommendations for reform the committee made as part of its report are doomed.

A deeper and perhaps more significant question is whether principles Americans have assumed were part of a free society will be sacrificed by the public's passive acceptance of practices heretofore considered anathema.

Will America tolerate covert arrangements between intelligence agents and academics, authors, journalists and publishers?

Although these questions are being asked in some quarters, there has been little public debate. Some see this as a reflection not so much of public apathy but of the feeling of helplessness on the part of a people bombarded with so many disclosures of wrongdoing.

Dr. Joseph D. Duffey, general secretary of the 85,000 member American Assn. of University Professors, has been astonished by the lack of outrage or even concern by most of the academic community to the disclosures about the covert relationships on campus.

"I find a bland acquiescence to what's really a total change in what we always assumed were the groundrules of a free society," he said.

Duffey was with a group of college

continued

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